










HOUSING IN WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA: 
ASSESSING THE LOAN SCHEME OF THE 
DECENTRALISED BUILT-TOGETHER 
PROGRAM USING THE BALANCE 
SCORECARD
By Harold Kisting (KSTHAR002)
A Minor dissertation presented to the Department of
Construction Economics and Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree M.Sc. in Property Studies
4 October 2013
Supervisor: Dr. Manya Mooya
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












1 I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use 
another’s work and pretend that it is one’s own.
2 I have used the Havard Referencing Style convention for 
citation and referencing. Each contribution to, and 
quotation in, this report from the work(s) of other people 
has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.
3 This report is my own work.
4 I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my 
work with the intention of passing it off as his or her own 
work.
5 I acknowledge that copying someone else’s assignment 





The purpose of this mini dissertation is to review the adequacy 
of Built-Together Program loan funds for the large scale delivery 
of adequate housing for low-income groups and to assess the 
performance of the loan scheme using the concept Balance
Scorecard as an assessment tool. 
The research method employs interview and survey methods to 
collect data. Data was collected and analyzed from an 
administrator and beneficiary perspective to understand the 
workings and the main characteristics of the program.
The primary beneficiaries of the Built-Together Program are the 
vulnerable in society and comprise primarily of women and 
single parents. It is therefore critical that the efficiency and 
sustainability of the loan scheme be improved to ensure that the 
needy in society continue to benefit.
One of the major findings of the research is that the Built-
Together Program is inadequate to deliver the most basic 
low-income house. It is therefore not surprising to hear and read 
about the dissatisfaction about the Built Together Program
expressed by the Namibian Government, local and regional 
councils and beneficiaries in the local media.
The research recommended that the authorities review the 
Program and bring it in line with the critical successes 
requirements for national housing policies and strategies.
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- CHAPTER 1 -
1 Introduction:
1.1 The International Challenge:
Housing delivery to the poor remains a major challenge in the world, 
especially in the developing countries where the bulk of the estimated 863 
million worldwide slum dwellers lived in 2012 (UN 2012: 56) .The challenge of 
housing is expected to get worse with the number of Informal settlements 
growing faster than the delivery of formal housing.  According to the UN-
Habitat, the urban slum dwellers are expected to reach 2 billion in 2020 
unless radical efforts are made to provide a range of affordable housing 
options (UN-Habitat 2009: 1). 
The world’s population was estimated to exceed 7 Billion on 31 October 2011 
according the United Nations and the world population numbers are 
increasing albeit at a slower pace (Worldometers 2012). These 7 Billion 
people need housing, food, water, sanitation, electricity, jobs, education and 
health facilities. Most of this growth in population is also experienced in 
developing countries who do not have the resources to accommodate the 
increasing numbers. 
In addition to the absolute increase in the numbers of people, most of the 
growth occurs in urban areas. According to the UN more than half the world’s 
population lived in urban areas by 2008 and the proportion is increasing (IHC 
2009). The world will grow at a forecasted rate of 1% for the period between 
2000 and 2030 (ibid). In comparison, the growth rate of the urban areas is 
estimated at 1.8% and the urban population is expected to double in 38 years 
(ibid).
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The UN is forecasting that 60% of the world population will live in urban areas 
by 2030 (ibid). In the developed world urbanization has stabilized at around 
75% and is anticipated to increase to 84% in 2030. In contrast, most of the 
urbanization is forecasted to occur in less developed countries. The urban 
population in less developed countries is expected to grow from 1.9 billion in 
2000 to 3.9 billion in 2030.The urban population of the developing countries is 
expected to reach 50% only in 2020 (ibid).
Sub-Saharan Africa is still  rural with only 37.3% living in urban areas in 1999
(UN 2012). Africa is the continent with the fastest urbanization rate of 4.87%. 
In 2012 about 62% of urban population in Sub-Saharan Africa lived in slums 
compared to 65% in 2000. The tipping point (the point where more than 50% 
will live in urban areas) for Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to be reach only in 
2032 (ibid).
Another dimension to the rapid urbanization of the developing world is the 
increasing levels of poverty concentrated in the urban areas of the developing 
world. According to the World Bank, the poor are urbanizing faster than the 
population as a whole. Data published by the World Bank suggest that 
urbanization is a positive force to development.  However, poverty is 
becoming more urban as urban slums multiply while the rural poor and overall 
poverty decrease (Ravallion 2007).
The United Nations with the Millennium Declaration in September 2000 at the 
Millennium Summit responded to the urban challenges with the adoption of 8 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) and 21 targets. Of particular 
importance to this paper is Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability, 
Target 11 which aims to significantly improve the lives of 100 million people in 
urban slums by 2020 (UN 2012).  According to The Millennium Development 
Goal’s Report of 2012, urban slum residents in the developing world declined 
from 39% in 2000 to 33% in 2012 (ibid). Despite the achievement of reducing 
the proportion of urban residents in slums the absolute number of people in 
slums continues to increase as a result of an increasing rate in urbanization. 
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The 2012 report estimates that about 863 million people live in slums 
compared to the 650 million in 1990 and the 760 million in 2000 (ibid).
In summary, housing the world population is an international challenge that is 
expected to get worse going forward especially in developing countries. The 
numbers of people involved and the rate of urbanization in particular in 
developing countries are overwhelming for national and local governments. 
Developing countries that experience the fastest population growth and the 
highest urbanization rates are also the least prepared and have the least 
resources to deal with the housing challenge. 
1.2 The National Challenge
According to the Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(NHIES) of 2009/2010 about 24% (about 105 000 households) of Namibia’s 
estimated 436,795 households live in improvised houses (NHIES 2009/2010: 
63). This figure is an increase of 7% compared to the previous survey of 
2003/2004. According to the Namibia Housing Action Group and Shack 
Dwellers Federation of Namibia the number of households living in 
impoverished housing is estimated at 134,884 units, housing an estimated 
541,119 people. NHAG also estimates that up to 25% of Namibia’s estimated 
2 million people live in informal settlements (NHAG 2009: 8). The NHAG and 
SDFN figure is about 20 000 households more than the NHIES estimate The 
2011 Census counted a total of 465,400 households with a population count 
of 2,104,900 and an average household size of 4.4 people. A total of 882,100 
people live in urban areas or an estimated 42.1%. In 2001 only 33% of 
Namibians lived in urban areas (GRN 2012).
In Windhoek the capital of Namibia with about 322 500 people, the 
Municipality of Windhoek estimates that about 99,370 people, or about 31% of 
the population live in informal settlements with a growth rate of 9.47%(City of 
Windhoek 2012). The city as a whole in contrast is only growing at an annual 
rate of 3.28% (ibid). The growth rate of the City of Windhoek as a whole at 
4
3.28% compared to the growth rate of the informal settlements at 9.47% 
confirms the international trend of the urbanization of poverty (ibid).
The Namibian Government as a signatory to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG’s) has identified housing as one of the top development priorities 
in all its national policy documents. Of particular importance is Goal 7, 
“Ensure Environmental Sustainability”, Target 11 which states that “By 2020, 
to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers” (UN-HABITAT 2012). 
Vision 2030 envisions Namibia as a highly urbanized country by 2030 with 
about 75% (2.6 million people) of the estimated 3.5 million people living in 
urban centers (GRN 2004: 49). Based on an estimated 80,000 housing 
backlog at the time of compiling the vision, a target  was set to build a 
minimum of 3000 houses per annum to meet the housing needs by the year 
2020 (GRN 2004: 106). Houses are to be built through the Build Together 
Program and the National Housing Enterprise.
The Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4) of Namibia states that 
Namibia will by 2017 have in place well established standards that allow every 
Namibian to have access to affordable housing with a total of 60% of the 
households living in modern houses from the 41% in 2009-2010 financial 
year. (GRN 2012: 14).
Namibia celebrated independence in 1990 and adopted the National Housing 
Policy in 1991 as a guide to address the national housing need. The National 
Housing Policy changed the role of the state from a provider of housing to a 
facilitator, effectively withdrawing the state from the direct construction of 
housing. The policy puts the responsibility of housing on the shoulders of the 
household head.  The National Shelter Strategy developed by Namibia with 
the assistance of UNDP (United Nations Development Program) and UNCHS 
(United Nations Centre for Human Settlements) identified housing finance as 
a critical constraint in the delivery of housing to the poor. The Shelter Strategy 
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led to the adoption of the Build Together Program (BTP) in 1992 as a key 
strategy in addressing the housing needs of the poor (Simion Undated: 6). 
The Built Together Program focuses on individuals with incomes between 
N$100 and N$3,000 who do not have access to credit from the traditional 
financial intermediaries. Housing loans vary between N$3,000 and N$40,000
per beneficiary. Following a bottom-up approach, the program has delivered 
on average 1,300 units per annum in rural and urban areas (MRLGH&RD 
1997). 
Unfortunately, the program has experienced many challenges. One of the key 
accusations is that, Local Governments who are responsible for the 
identification and allocation of funds to individual households allegedly 
misallocates built together funds to pay service accounts for bulk water and 
electricity. “You received millions, but houses were not built” (Steenkamp  
2011). At the time, the minister also threatened to terminate the program in its 
current form and adopt a more centralized approach to provide finished 
houses and financing to the poor. “Instead of giving funds to people to 
construct or acquire their own low cost housing, Build Together will construct 
a range of pre-designed houses of different sizes, which people can then 
apply to buy. He explained that this is a more economical option, as it cuts out 
unnecessary intermediate costs, while spending will be cost effective”
(Steenkamp 2011:1). 
After so many warnings from the Minister, the BT Scheme continues to be 
mired with problems. In August 2012, The Namibian ran a story with the 
headline “Tses low-cost houses remain incomplete” (Cloete 2012:3). 
According to the article houses of some people whose loans were approved in 
2008 are still not finished. According to the community, the construction of the 
houses came to a standstill because the Council was withholding loans. 
According to the Council, they stopped loan payments to some beneficiaries 
who failed to build their houses to a required level and spent the money on 
other things (Cloete 2012:3).
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According to the Auditor-General’s report the record for book keeping for local 
and regional council’s remains a source of concern. According to Isaacs 2012
a common thread that ran through the audit reports of 14 councils was a 
complete lack of internal controls at the councils on which the auditors could 
rely for their auditing purposes. Isaacs further highlights that a major 
challenge to many of the councils evaluation was the administration of Build 
Together groups funds. “Issues here ranged from councils not having any 
supporting documents for the movement of these funds, to loans being 
granted to individuals not legally qualifying for such (Isaacs 2012: 5). Khorixas 
for example failed to update their system since 2006 and there were no 
records of new loans issued or repayments made since then. The Hardap 
Regional Council who was found as prudent, failed to record N$100,000 grant 
to the Build Together Fund in its cash books. In the Hardap region recipients 
apparently also failed to make repayments in 2008 (ibid). “ It was also not 
possible to determine the repayments of the loans as the council does not 
have a system of collections of loan repayments from the beneficiaries. The 
auditors also noted that the councils do not conduct reconciliation and age 
analysis … (and) that the Chief Regional Officer did not sign the applications 
for approvals of the loans as required by the (manual)” (Auditor General, 
Junias Kandjeke quoted in Isaacs 2012: 5). 
According to Dr. Anna Muller of the National Housing Action Group (NHAG) 
any formal process of addressing the housing problem of the poor in Namibia 
will fail because the majority in need of housing has incomes that do not allow 
them to purchase houses through banks. According to her, the only affordable 
solution to housing the urban poor is through the Shack Dwellers Federation 
of Namibia (SDFN). The SDFN caters for people with an income below 
N$2000, and members can qualify for a loan of N$25,000 to build a dwelling 
(Paulus. 2012). 
The SDFN was established in 1998 and comprise a network of saving 
schemes that aims to improve the living conditions of low income people living 
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in impoverished housing. The SDFN is supported by NHAG a local NGO who 
coordinates professional services for the community savings scheme. The 
SDFN has a revolving fund namely Twahangana Loan Fund that is partly 
funded by the government, re-payments and donors.  Local savings groups 
are required to save up to 5% of the deposit before they can access the fund. 
Within a 12 months period between July 2009 and June 2010, the SDFN 
delivered 366 houses and a further 322 were in progress (IPPR 2011:18).
To qualify for a Namibia Housing Enterprise (NHE) loan, a household requires 
a monthly income of between N$5000 and N$20,000 and a maximum joint 
income of N$30,000. The NHE also requires 20% collateral or a deposit of 
5%. The NHE delivered an average of 457 houses per annum since 1990, but 
since 2003 the rate of delivery has decreased with the lowest recorded in 
2007 when only 129 houses were delivered compared to the 600 houses per 
year between 1990 to 2002 (IPPR undated: 18).
2 Research Problem: Context.
Firstly, Namibia’s overall response to the housing problem is also not very 
clear. According to the National Housing Policy (2009), the government aims 
to delivery 2,200 units per annum, in contrast the Medium Budget targets to 
deliver 1,300 units per annum until 2014, while governments TIPEEG 
(Targeted Intervention Program for Employment and Economic Growth) 
program targets to deliver 1,507 low cost housing units per annum until 2014. 
Vision 2030 published in 2004 on the other hand targets to deliver 3,200 units
per annum until 2006 while NHE targets to deliver 7,937 houses with 1,000 
affordable units delivered by 2006 (IPPR undated:23).
Secondly, the scale of the housing problem is immense. Housing the world’s
population is an international problem that is expected to get worse with more 
than 2 billion urban slum dwellers estimated in 2020 from an estimated 863 
million in 2012. This is more than 1.1 billion additional urban slum dwellers in 
less than 10 years time. 
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In Namibia, official sources estimates the number of people without adequate 
shelter at 24% or about 105,000 households. In Windhoek, the capital about 
31% or 99,370 people live in impoverished housing, growing at 9.47% per 
annum. 
Thirdly, the rate of housing delivery is far below the required rate to firstly 
address the annual demand for housing and secondly, to reduce the backlog. 
In 2004, Namibia’s Vision 2030 determined a delivery rate of a minimum of 
3000 housing units annually to eliminate the estimated backlog by the year 
2020. Instead of decreasing the estimated backlog of 80,000 units overtime, 
the backlog has increased to an estimated 105 000 households according to 
the latest government report (NHIES 2012). 
Taking a look at the actual housing delivery rate in Namibia, the housing 
problem is expected to get worse overtime. The BTP program overtime has 
delivered on average 1,300 units per annum while NHE delivered on average 
600 units per annum. Compared to a target of a minimum of 3,000 units per 
annum, the actual average delivery of 1,900 units per annum is simply 
inadequate to reach the Vision 2030 target of adequately housing Namibians 
by 2020. The failure to deliver the targeted minimum of 3,000 units per annum 
will also frustrate the NDP4 with its aim to allow every Namibian to have 
access to affordable housing with a total of 60% of Namibians living in modern 
houses by 2017.
Government alone cannot adequately address the housing problem. A 
successful solution requires the involvement of communities and the private 
sector. The regulatory environment must therefore be conducive for 
communities, non-government organizations and the private sector to 
participate.
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Fourthly, the people in need of housing have the least resources and can 
least afford to house themselves. The poor are continuing to flood to urban 
areas urbanizing faster than the population as a whole. 
The pyramid below shows the overall response of Namibia to her housing 
problem. Looking at Namibia’s overall response to the housing problem, it is 
clear that various actors are involved focusing on very distinct markets. As 
expected, the banks are focusing on the high end of the market while 
government involvement increases to the lower end of the market.
Table: 1.1 Namibia’s response to the housing need:
More than 20,000 High Banks and other Financial 
Institutions
N$5000-N$20,000 Middle NHE and Other Institutions
N$100-N$3,000 Low Build Together Programme  
and Shack Dwellers 
Federation
Less than N$100 Ultra-Low Housing Trust Fund and 
Shack Dwellers Federation
No Income Social Cases Housing Trust Fund and 
Shack Dwellers Federation
(Adapted from the National Housing Enterprise: Undated)  
It is clear from the pyramid that the Build Together Program is critical in 
delivering housing to the poor. According to 
IPPR , about 52% of the backlog in housing falls within the income group 
earning less than N$1,501. An additional 35% of the backlog falls between the 
income groups of N$1,501 to N$4600. Only 12.9% of the backlog earns more 
than N$4601. (IPPR undated: 7)
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Finally, adequate housing is defined as more than shelter and puts additional 
resource requirements on national governments. To understand the full scale 
of the housing problem one needs to understand the definition of adequate 
shelter by Habitat. The definition of adequate shelter by the Habitat Agenda is 
much more than a roof over ones head. It includes adequate privacy, 
adequate space, physical accessibility, adequate security, security of tenure, 
structural stability and durability, adequate lighting, heating and ventilation, 
adequate basic infrastructure, such as water-supply, sanitation and waste-
management facilities; suitable environmental quality and health related 
factors; and adequate and accessible location with regard to work and basic 
facilities  (UN-Habitat 1997).
To recap, the actual demand for housing and the annual growth rate in the 
demand for housing in Namibia is overwhelming. The failure of Namibia to 
address the housing problem is evident in the ever increasing numbers and 
densities of informal settlements. To address the Namibian housing problem 
requires coordinated and sustained efforts, matched by the allocation of 
sufficient resources at national and local level.
3 BTP Research Problem Statement.
Following the discussions on the international and national challenges and the 
discussion on the context of the housing problem, it is clear that the provision 
of adequate housing remains a tricky matter to solve. Although the nature and 
the scale of the Namibian housing problem are different, the issues that the 
Namibian authorities battle with are the same as those at international level. 
Adequate housing, especially for the poor and the vulnerable in society 
remains a challenge for the Namibian government.
The problem the research will address is how an internationally award winning 
program, like the BTP that has such a large proportion of beneficiaries as 
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women, who are considered a vulnerable group can be regarded as a total 
failure by the Minister responsible for housing. 
Research Questions:
This paper will consider why the BT Program in Namibia can be considered a 
success or a failure? 
The specific questions to be answered in this paper are:
1 Is the BTP a focused and targeted program?
2 Are the targets of the BT Program clear and do these targets
motivate and inspire stakeholders and institutions involved in the 
program? 
3 Is the BTP response informed by the nature and size of the housing 
problem within the targeted group? 
4 Is the current rate of delivery of the BTP and financial resources 
adequate to address annual demand in the target group and to 
reduce the housing backlog on a sustainable basis? 
5 Can the target group afford the products offered by the BTP?
6 Does the housing solution offered by the BTP meet the 
requirements of ‘adequate housing’ as defined by the UN?
4 Conceptual and Analytical Framework
The research uses the Balance Scorecard as a conceptual and analytical tool 
to assess the adequacy of the BTP in addressing Namibia’s housing need. 
There is no formal tool to assess the effectiveness of housing policy in an 
objective manner. Assessments normally focus on specific areas like product
quality, financial performance, beneficiary acceptance and the sustainability of 
the policy.  The Balance Scorecard was selected as an analytical tool to make 
a holistic and balanced assessment of the BT Program using the four 
perspectives of the BS. The BT Program might fare very well on the one 
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theme for example on the financial indicators while it fails dismally on the 
indicators measuring beneficiary satisfaction. The Balance Scorecard is 
therefore used as an analytical tool to give a balanced and objective view of 
the BT Program.
The Balance Scorecard was developed by Kaplan and Norton as a tool to 
solve a measurement problem in assessing the performance of commercial 
organizations, not for profit organizations and government institutions. Over 
the years the BS has development into a tool to describe, measure and 
manage strategy. 
In short the BS according to Ahn claims to fill the gap between the 
development of a strategy and its realization by supporting and linking four 
“critical management processes:
1 Clarify and translate vision and strategy,
2 Communicate and link strategic objectives and measures;
3 Plan, set targets, and align strategic initiatives;
4 Enhance strategic feedback and learning (Ahn 2001: 441).
The BS is organized along four perspectives namely, financial perspective, 
customer perspective, process perspective and learning and Growth 
perspective 
The financial perspective tries to answer the question what do investors 
expect and what are the strategic goals from a financial perspective? The 
customer perspective ask the question which strategic goals are to be set to 
meet the customer needs in order to attain the financial goals? The process 
perspective asks the question which strategic goals are to be set for the 
internal processes in order to fulfill the expectations of customers and 
investors? Finally, the learning and growth perspective ask the question how 
must the organization learn and improve to develop key potentials in order to 
provide an excellent basis for outstanding results in the other perspectives?
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The structure of the BS is streamlined to achieve targets and ultimately the 
vision of the organization. According to Kaplan et al, the execution of strategy 
is more important than the quality of strategy and having a vision. Strategy is 
defined as “the unique and sustainable ways by which organizations create 
value” (Kaplan 2001: 2).
The table below gives an overview of the generic structure of the BS system. 
It is in this simplicity and connectivity of the logical framework that the power 
of the BS as a tool for defining, measuring, communicating strategy lies.
Table: 1.2 Example Balance Scorecard
Strategy Theme Objective Measurement Target Initiative
Financial 
Perspective
“ If we Succeed, 











“To achieve our 
vision, how must we 










“To satisfy our 
customer, at which 












“To Achieve my 











Source: Adapted from Kaplan 2001:71
5 Aims, Objectives and Hypothesis:
The aim of this research paper is to assess the adequacy of the Namibian 
BTP by taking a closer look at how focused the BTP is and if the Program is 
delivering at an appropriate scale with sufficient resources delivering a 
product that meet the requirements of adequate shelter as defined by the UN.
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As earlier stated, the Namibian Shelter Strategy lead to the adoption of the 
Build Together Program (BTP) in 1992 as a key strategy in addressing the 
housing needs of the poor (Simion Undated: 6). 
The key objective of the research paper is to assess the overall performance 
of the BTP using the Balance Scorecard methodology. In particular the 
research has the following objectives:
1) To assess the focus of the Program;
2) To review the adequacy of delivery targets and the actual delivery of 
the BTP;
3) To review the adequacy of allocated resources to BTP;
4) To assess if the targeted population can afford the housing solution 
offered by the BTP;
5) To assess if the housing solution offered by the BTP meet the 
requirements of ‘adequate housing’ as defined by the the UN.
6) To review the systems and procedures of the BTP;
7) To improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the BTP; and
8) To make recommendations for improving the BTP.
The hypothesis of this paper is that the BTP failed to provide adequate and 
affordable housing at an appropriate scale, because funds are inadequate 
while the process of allocation allows for misappropriation at local government 
level.
6 Significance of Work
Firstly, the work is significant because the minister responsible for housing 
has threatened to terminate the program because of perceived poor delivery 
of the BTP. The BTP was awarded the Habitat Scroll of Honour in 1993 and 
World Habitat Award in 1994 (Simion Undated). Further, women as a 
vulnerable group comprise 47% of the BTP beneficiaries in terms of access to 
shelter, land, finance and are involved in organising local committees, 
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producing building materials and constructing their own housing ( ibid). The 
BT Program has further provided an opportunity to many destitute households 
to house themselves with very little financial support provided by central 
government through the program. A house in the urban area is the base from 
which a household access jobs, services and other opportunities and it will be 
a tragedy if the only program that provides hope to so many poor households 
in Namibia is terminated by government without a proper assessment of the 
performance of the program.
As previously stated, the problem that has to be addressed is how a program 
that received international acclaim and have such a large proportion of 
beneficiaries as women, who are considered a vulnerable group can be 
regarded as a total failure by the Minister responsible for housing. 
Given the scale of the Namibian housing problem, it appears that the BTP is 
one of the more successful strategies of the Namibian Government to 
respond to the immense housing problem. The BTP is the only program in 
Namibia that allows households to actively take part in housing. It will 
therefore be a great loss if the program is stopped. In light of the above it 
appears that the BTP must remain and it should in fact be amplified.
Secondly, it is the first time that the Balance Scorecard is used in assessing 
housing policy and strategy. It appears that the use of Balance Scorecard 
concepts and analytical tools will add significantly to the focus and 
effectiveness of housing policy in general. In particular the Balance Scorecard 
conceptual system can contribute to the improvement of the BTP in Namibia.
The BTP has four sub programs namely, Urban/Rural housing loans, social 
housing, informal settlement upgrading and single quarter’s transformation. 
This paper will focus on Urban/Rural housing loans and in particular BT 
Program loans in the City of Windhoek.
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7 Method:
The paper will use various research methods to test the hypothesis that the 
BTP failed to realize the objective of providing adequate housing at an 
appropriate scale that is affordable to low income groups in Namibia.
Firstly, the Balance Scorecard concept and analytical tools were adopted as 
appropriate to assess the BTP program.
Secondly, a literature review was done to review and understand the latest 
developments in assessing the performance of low-income housing.
Thirdly, face to face interviews with key personnel at key institutions involved 
in the BTP were done to establish their perspectives on the success of the 
Program and how the Program can be improved. Officials interviewed were 
from the Ministry of Regional, Local Government, Housing and Rural 
Development, the City of Windhoek, Namibia Housing Action Group and the 
Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia.
Finally, the main empirical data was obtained from a sample of 30 households 
who benefited from the Program.
8 Limitations
The research aims to analyze the effectiveness of the BTP and the focus 
therefore is on the beneficiaries of the program. Most of the BTP houses were 
built in the City of Windhoek and Windhoek is therefore taken as the 
laboratory for the study.
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9 Structure of the Report:
The structure of the report is divided into 5 chapters as listed below: 
Chapter 1: Establish the rationale for the research;
Chapter 2: Literature Review;
Chapter 3: Research Method;
Chapter 4: Data Analysis;
Chapter 5: Findings, Recommendations and conclusions.
The structure of the report is informed by the diagram below as captured by 
Punch 2005. Chapter 1 and 2 deal with pre-empirical concerns of defining the 
research area, reviewing the literature and context, defining the topic, 
research questions and the hypothesis. Chapter 3 and 4 define the research 
design, the data collection method, data analysis and finally test the 
hypothesis. The final chapter, Chapter 5 provides the key findings of the 
research and make recommendations to improve the BTP program.
Diagram: 1.1
Chapter 2 develops the critical success factors of a successful housing 
strategy drawing from the literature and case studies. The chapter critically 
reviews the literature and goes on to conceptualize how housing markets 
work and then discuss housing finance systems. Finally the chapter discuss 



















Chapter 3 focuses on the research method used for data collection and 
reporting. The chapter highlights the challenges of doing research in 
low-income settlements and introduces the Balance Scorecard as the primary 
assessment tool to be used in the research. Chapter 3 then moves into 
discussing the research design and research execution.
Chapter 4 concentrate on data analysis and analyze and report on the data 
collected through interviews and the survey. The chapter then tests the 
hypothesis that the Built-Together Program’s has failed to realize the objective 
of providing adequate housing to the poor.
Chapter 5 is the final chapter and highlights the main findings and 
recommendations and goes on to make final concluding remarks.
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- CHAPTER 2  -
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The literature review for the research starts with a brief overview of housing 
policy and its successes followed by a discussion on the housing market and 
financial issues in the low-income housing sector. The section ends with a 
review of empirical work in the field and a discussion of two case studies 
namely the Experimental Housing Allowance Program and the Grameen Bank 
to inform the research.
2.2 Housing Policy Antecedents
The rationale for public intervention in housing markets is based on the three 
traditional reasons namely public health, housing as a ‘merit good’ and market 
imperfections.  Over the last 60 years, housing policies have gone through a 
number of alterations to respond to the economic and social challenges of the 
day (Choguill 2007).
Governments are generally limited in how they can respond to the challenge 
of housing. Firstly government can build houses and rent the houses out at 
full or subsidized rates or give the houses to “deserving” recipients. Secondly 
governments can make houses more affordable by lowering the price. Thirdly, 
governments can improve the housing market to improve home ownership by 
making for example mortgages readily available and improving access to 
land (Choguill 2007:142).
Immediately after World War 2 up to about the 1970’s governments
responded to the housing market by delivering large-scale public housing 
programs. Public housing units were mostly for rent although few could afford 
to pay market related rent. Western planning principles and techniques were 
seen as the solution to the problem of informal settlements (UN Habitat: 2003 
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and Ward 1982 quoted in Mooya 2009: 58). The model developed by the 
United Kingdom for its own people was also promoted in its colonies 
depending on the availability of resources. Governments started by 
determining the demand for housing by quantifying housing shortages 
considering the existing backlog (families who were living in substandard 
housing) and the additional units needed in the future. The next step involved 
the supply of the required number of units by delivery of conventional 
‘low-cost’ housing units (Mooya 2009: 59).  The approach to housing delivery 
in the first phase was supported by an underlying belief that the state is 
responsible for housing its citizens (Beal 2000 quoted in Mooya 2009:59). 
Congruent to the belief that the state was responsible for housing the poor 
was a perception that informal settlements and slums were a scar on the 
urban landscape. As a result, demolitions and forced evictions were rife 
during this time (Mooya 2009:59).   
Unfortunately, public housing programs failed to deliver housing at a 
significant scale to ameliorate the housing challenge (Choguill 2007:143).  
Most governments could not deliver ‘low-income’ housing at an adequate 
scale because financial resources were scarce and the houses were primarily 
provided for civil servants and the military. At the same time, the poor could 
not afford the housing units and also could not make the repayments or pay 
true rent on public housing while governments were not in a position to extend 
subsides to the general public. During this time it was common to find houses 
constructed for the poor occupied by middle income families, a phenomenon 
known as  downward raiding (Choguill 2007:143, Mooya 2009:59). 
According to Mooya the failure to make significant inroads at the housing 
problem was as a result of limited supplies and wrong targeting (Mooya 
2009:59).  In addition to the shortage of finances, housing projects also failed 
to recognize the needs of the poor. Governments focused on issues of sound 
building design and adequate sanitation at the expense of sound location, 
especially proximity to workplaces. The poor were also prohibited from using 
their newly acquired houses as a base to earn an income through hawking 
21
and home industries. In addition these houses also had limited space and the 
relocation broke down social networks which are critical to the survival of the 
poor (Mooya 2009:59). 
The second phase in housing policies started with the launch of self-help 
projects when international institutions and governments realized in the face 
of resource scarcity and low affordability levels that providing housing to the 
poor was not the solution to solve the housing problem (Ward 1982, in Mooya 
2009:60). In the face of resource scarcity and in a political climate that 
emphasized restraint on government spending, the previous Welfare State 
system of providing housing to the poor was terminated and the more cost 
effective self-help schemes were adopted.  The self-help model was based on 
the poor building their own houses and with government assistance the cost 
per house could be reduced to allow the poor to own a home. Policy makers 
now advocated the approach of moving away from expensive ‘package’ 
housing such as the conventional ‘low-income’ fully serviced housing projects 
toward elements of housing delivery such as infrastructure, the provision of 
construction materials and technical advice (Ward 1982, in Mooya 2009:60). 
During the 1970’s, the idea of aided self-help was born, a concept that still 
informs present day housing policy (Choguill 2007). Aided self-help has a 
number of variants with sites and services and upgrading dominating the 
policy front. The premise of the site and service concept was that government 
should provide serviced land and allow the poor to build their own houses. 
Sites and services holds that the poor would be in a position to house 
themselves if the government provide building sites, basic infrastructure and 
improve environmental conditions.  The model was based on full cost 
recovery as resources were scarce and few governments could subsidize the 
projects (Choguill 2007). 
The World Bank championed the idea and promoted sites and services 
projects beginning in 1972. Even with minimal government investments, the 
sites and services projects were still too expensive for at least 20% of most 
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urban populations (Choguill 2007). To make the projects more affordable, 
efforts were focused on reducing standards, but there was little improvement 
in the cost recovery record of the projects. Even, when the emphasis moved 
to up-grading existing housing as opposed to undertaking comprehensive 
sites and services projects on greenfield sites, the required cost recovery 
objectives were not met (Choguill 2007:143). In short, the sites and services 
programs were met with widespread failure, as projects experience problems 
with land acquisition, insufficient resources and poor cost recovery for the 
infrastructure and services proved (UN Habitat 2003; Werlin 1999 quoted in 
Mooya 2009: 60).
The third phase of housing policies started in the mid 1980’s when in 
particular the World Bank realized that the sites and services model to 
housing delivery was not going to work on the scale required to meet the 
housing shortages at the time. The upgrading philosophy holds that the poor 
has already showed organizational skill in erecting their own houses under 
challenging circumstances and will maintain improved facilities provided by 
governments, while gradually bettering their homes (UN Habitat 2003; Werlin
1999 quoted in Mooya 2009: 60). The concept of upgrading involves in situ
regularization of the rights to land and housing and the improvement of 
existing infrastructure. Upgrading policies tend to focus on three main areas 
according to the UN (Mooya 2009: 61) namely:
1 Provision of basic urban infrastructure (water, sewer, electricity 
roads;
2 Provision of secure tenure and facilitating access to land;
3 Facilitating access to credit based on the economic profile, needs 
and requirements of communities.
In-situ upgrading was accepted as the ultimate solution to forced relocation 
and eviction as it minimizes the disturbance to the social and economic life of 
the poor.  Unfortunately, upgrading programs could not be sustained because 
of limited financial resources and the continued increase in the number of the 
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urban poor. Governments failed to provide essential services while the 
communities failed to maintain facilities (Mooya 2009: 61). 
In 1993 the World Bank adopted a new housing policy statement which 
emphasized enablement, the sector’s contribution to macroeconomic 
development, and pro-poor policies involving targeted subsidies where 
required. In contrast to the earlier policies that targeted solving the housing 
problem through the construction of houses and self-help, the ‘enablement 
strategy’ was now directed on removing bottlenecks in the housing markets
(Choguill 2007:143).
The thinking now shifted to providing an ‘enabling environment’ within which 
governments can develop policies to solve the housing problems (Mooya 
2009: 61). The enabling approach adopted by the Habitat Agenda of 1996 
was widely accepted as the best way forward. Government now withdrew to a 
facilitative role and fostering efficient markets an approach based on the neo-
liberal principles. The ‘enabling approach’ advocates for the involvement of 
informal settlement dwellers not only in the construction process, but also in 
the decision making and design process that establishes priorities for action 
and support for implementation (Mooya 2009: 61). The focus was now on 
devising ways of providing the economic, financial, legal and institutional 
environment required to support the housing sector (Choguill 2007:143).
To remove bottlenecks in the housing delivery system, governments over the 
years intervened either on the supply or demand side of the system (Galster 
1997). On the demand side, governments intervened by giving financial 
assistance directly to the household to boost the financial capacity of 
households to occupy an appropriate house. Demand side interventions 
include providing housing allowances, housing vouchers or rent supplements
(Galster 1997). The key characteristic here is that the financial assistance 
goes to the individual household. The supply side strategy in contrast is 
attached to the structure as opposed to the household. It involves the 
subsidizing of the construction or refurbishment of existing housing to reduce 
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the rent or the price charged to low-income households (Galster 1997). The 
buildings may be owned by private entrepreneurs or public bodies and are 
normally labeled as council housing, public housing or social housing. Over 
the years since 1980s the emphasis in the US, Canada and several European 
nations has shifted to demand side approaches that are generally regarded as 
more effective (Galster 1997: 561).
2.3 The Success Record of Housing Policies
Over the years all government interventions in the housing delivery system 
fared dismally because the number of people living in inadequate housing 
continues to grow according to UN reports. 
According to Choguill, sustainable housing solution should be designed to 
meet three primary objectives (Choguill 2007:143). The first objective is that 
housing policies must provide the basis for household improvement. Secondly 
poor people must be empowered and finally the policies must give 
psychologically the poor a feeling of self-worth.
In order to achieve sustainability in the housing sector, policies in five areas 
must be devised and implemented (Choguill 2007:143). The first policy area 
requires the involvement of the community, secondly access to good quality 
building materials at an affordable cost, thirdly appropriate building standards, 
fourthly accessible housing finances, and finally the availability of adequate 
land.
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2.4 Understanding How Housing Markets Work
A proper understanding of how the housing market works is necessary to 
understand and predict the effectiveness of housing policies. 
The conceptual framework for understanding how housing markets operate 
has two essential elements (Galster 1997: 561). Housing markets are 
understood as a choice of interrelated sub markets of distinct qualities. The 
supply of private housing changes through new construction and conversions 
in response to alterations in the cross-sub-market pattern of profitability.
According to Galster ibid, from an analytical perspective, a locality’s housing 
market should be understood as a segmented, interconnected array of 
housing sub-markets. The different sub-markets are a representation of the 
different set of exchange possibilities for the rental or sale of dwelling units. 
The different sub-markets, although different in building, parcel, status, 
environment and neighborhood conditions, are perceived as reasonably close 
substitutes by the consumers and suppliers of housing. Quality is perceived in 
a range by consumers and suppliers (Galster 1997: 563).
Galster ibid notes that the quality segmentation of the housing market has two 
important implications. Firstly, each sub-market has its own demand and 
supply dynamics because the quality attributes of houses are not perfectly 
substitutable.  Secondly, the sub-markets are interrelated, because there is
some substitutability among them. Households might switch between the 
different sub-markets, but also suppliers can move their stock from one sub-
market to the next by either upgrading or downgrading their units while 
builders of new units might view the different sub-markets as competition. 
Housing sub-markets therefore respond to demand/supply dynamics within 
the sub-market, but also across submarkets. The magnitude and patterns of 
demand and supply adjustment are not uniform and will differ across the 
different sub-markets. The magnitude of sub-market responses is higher 
where there is closer substitutability (Galster 1997:563). 
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According to Galster ibid, the number of private suppliers of housing stock is 
significant in the low and moderate quality sub-markets in a given locality. 
These private suppliers are assumed to respond to changing market 
conditions by physically modifying the existing stock to improve or degrade its 
condition and/or build new units in some of the sub-markets to maximize the 
rate of return on their investments (Galster 1997).
Galster ibid notes that in each sub-market a short term rent and occupancy 
will be defined by the interaction of the sub-market determined by the sub-
market demand and the stock potentially available in the sub market. Demand 
in each of the sub-markets is determined by income and household type, 
composition, distribution and relative rents across substitute submarkets. The 
return for private property owners is defined by the rents and occupancy 
levels and the cost structure of each of the submarkets. The rate of return 
may be higher or lower across the different sub-markets or investments 
achieved outside the housing sector (Galster 1997).
According to Galster 1997, the conceptual model has three key implications 
for housing policy interventions. Firstly, policies that target to improve the 
living conditions of the lowest quality sub-markets may not necessarily be 
constrained to the sub-market to affect them. Secondly, impacts of policies 
targeted at the lowest quality level sub-markets will not be contained within 
that sub-market, but will spread to near-quality sub-markets through mobility 
of households between the sub-markets and response of private property 
owners. Third, the immediate, short-term impacts of the policy are likely to be 
modified significantly over a longer period as the private suppliers of housing 
alter the distribution of housing stock across sub-markets in response to 
policy induced changes in the rate of return  property owners can earn in the 
various sub-markets (Galster 1997: 563).
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2.5 Housing Finance Systems
Providing proper housing is capital intensive and not even the well-off middle 
income group in developed and developing countries can acquire a house 
without a mortgage or long term financing. Although the nature of the 
problems, resources and modes of delivery differ, many governments even in 
first world countries are faced with the challenge of providing financing for 
social housing. 
According to Renaud 1999, obtaining commercial housing finance for the poor 
especially in developing countries is normally close to impossible. The current 
mortgage lending practices require that households have sustainable jobs 
linked to predicable income streams together with collateral to qualify for a 
mortgage. A significant proportion of the households in especially the 
developing countries do not have collateral, permanent jobs or predicable, 
secure incomes.  These households are normally linked to the informal 
economy where no official records exist of their historical income (Renaud 
ibid). 
Developing countries according to Renaud ibid normally lack pro-active and 
well articulated housing finance strategies that are concerned with the overall 
efficiency of financial markets. New housing finance strategies are focused on 
the efficiency of mortgage markets. Safe and sound housing finance systems 
organized on a commercial basis is facilitated by the acceleration of world 
urbanization and the global transformation of financial systems. (Renaud 
1999: 760).  The rapid expansion of private competitive commercial housing 
finance is essential to finance the waves of urbanization in developing 
countries as national and local governments do not have the resources to 
meet the housing challenges presented by rapid urbanization (Renaud 1999:
760).  
According to Renaud ibid the forces that are changing financial systems and 
are also affecting housing finance services include financial liberation, 
28
financial innovation, global convergence of banking regulation and supervision 
and the digital transformation. Financial liberation began in the US already in 
the 1970’s and has since spread across financial markets. Financial 
innovation is leading towards seamless financial markets focusing on 
providing specialized financial services as opposed to specialized institutions 
such as mortgage finance. The other forces that shape housing finance are 
the global convergence in banking regulation and supervision that was set in 
motion by the Basle Committee and the digital information revolution that is 
changing every aspect of banking and finance such is payment systems, 
settlement systems and risk management, automated loan underwriting 
systems and home banking (Renaud 1999:760).
According to Renaud “The number and condition of our houses is a symptom 
of our methods of financing them …”(Renaud 1999: 151). Renaud continues 
by highlighting that unless we fully understand the implications of our methods 
of financing, taxing and subsidizing our houses we cannot arrive at any 
solution to our housing problems. The basic principle of finance is that the 
financial services that we are designing should fit the economic characteristics 
of the product or activity that we intend to finance. Therefore to design a 
sound housing finance a thorough understanding of housing markets is 
essential…”(Renaud 1999: 151). 
According to Mitlin 2008, over the last 15 years, innovative housing finance 
solutions were developed by low-income groups to support housing, 
infrastructure and community development. Low-income households 
especially in informal settlements have managed to improve their living 
conditions by negotiating tenure security, constructing and extending their 
houses and in some cases even providing their own  water and sanitation 
networks. The schemes in informal settlements normally combine individual 
savings, group savings, loans from the group, government and micro loans 
and subsidies from governments to improve the living conditions of the poor. 
The environment created by the withdrawal of the state from direct provision 
of housing, the focus of governments on working with finance to enable 
29
greater choice for beneficiaries, financial deregulation and growth in the 
microfinance industry has improved access to finance. According to Mitlin, 
innovative approaches using savings and loans to transform low-income 
neighborhoods have demonstrated impact at scale (Mitlin 2008: 1). 
2.6 Typology of Housing Finance Systems
According to Renaud, it is possible to determine from their visual appearance, 
how housing units and neighborhoods have been funded in developing 
countries. Renaud distinguishes among three main types of housing 
production systems that are shaped by their financing (Renaud 1999: 762). 
Informal financing according to Renaud ibid relies on small, localized mutual 
and irregular forms of finance that are usually dependent on common local 
ties. The system is based on various ways of pooling savings.  Informal 
financing leads to incremental forms of housing investment and owners 
become ‘self-developers’. According to Renaud ibid, this system dominates 
many cities and their neighborhoods look like endless, almost permanent 
construction sites. 
Renaud ibid notes that private bank financing facilitates the production of a 
diversified stock of completed housing units that are built in a relatively short 
time, by professional and experienced developers. The units are produced in 
a very competitive real estate industry with a wide variety of enterprises of all 
sizes (Renaud 1999).
According to Renaud ibid state financed projects are characterized by large-
scale housing projects dominated by engineering objectives and consist of 
standardized, monotonous units of relatively high cost by low value for their 
occupants (Renaud 1999: 762).
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2.7 Issues in Housing Finance
According to the UN 2009, there are two essential issues that stand out in 
housing finance in developing countries. First is the mobilization of household 
savings in the form of financial assets. Household savings form the largest 
part of domestic savings and are therefore an important source of housing 
finance. The second issue deals with the process of lending and determines 
how financial institutions give various income groups access to housing loans 
(UN 2009:3).
Domestic saving according to the UN are influenced by inflation, returns on 
savings, liquidity, security, access to financial services and the level of the 
country’s development. Access to housing loans on the other hand is primarily 
influenced by transaction costs, collateral requirements, affordability and 
subsides (UN 1994).
According to the UN ibid domestic savings in developing countries are 
generally low for a number of reasons. Developing countries are normally 
characterized by high inflation which erodes the value of financial assets and 
thereby discouraging households to save. High inflation raises the risk of long-
term financial contracts and makes it difficult to make sensible long term 
investment decisions. In an environment of rapid inflation and administered 
interest rates, financial institutions cannot offer positive real rates of interest to 
depositors which further discourage long term savings. Many savers in 
developing countries in particular those with low incomes have a preference 
for high liquidity and want their savings to be instantly available for when it’s 
needed.  Confidence in the financial sector is also low which further 
discourages domestic savings (UN 1994).
Savings according to the UN ibid are also influenced by the access that 
households have to financial services. Low-income households are normally 
excluded from financial services as financial services are lacking in low-
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income areas while low-income residents do not feel comfortable to deal with 
formal institutions. The level of economic development is also generally low in 
Developing countries and the financial dept is low. Financial depth is the ratio 
measure as the ratio of financial assets to GNP (UN 1994).
Sources of housing finance according to the UN ibid are also limited in 
developing countries. Developing countries primarily rely on voluntary savings 
and government allocations to finance housing development. Voluntary 
savings consist of household savings in formal and informal institutions. 
Budgetary allocation by government which can either come from tax revenue, 
loans and guarantees are normally an important source of finance for housing 
through subsidized loans. Budgetary allocations normally depend on the state 
of the local economy and the ability of national governments to collect tax 
revenue (UN1994).
Funds from mandatory savings such as pension and provident funds are 
normally not available for housing although these funds are ideal for housing 
finance because they are typically large, buoyant and long-term (UN1994: 8). 
Secondary markets according to the UN 1994 are limited in developing 
countries because they are still in their infancy stages to play a significant role 
in housing finance. According to the UN ibid, the process of financing in 
developing countries is complex and intricate, increasing transaction costs on 
loans issued because of their requirements for collateral and proof of 
affordability. Transaction costs for long term financing like mortgage lending is 
accompanied by cost of monitoring and enforcement. Most poor households 
cannot produce formal evidence of their income and financial institutions face 
significant difficulty in establishing creditworthiness of applicants. In order to 
reduce lending risk, housing-finance institutions require information on 
borrowers, design appropriate mortgage contracts, monitor loan recovery and 
foreclose where necessary (UN 1994:10). All these costs refer to transaction 
costs and can be high especially in developing countries where land and 
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income information is difficult to verify and incidence of default is high and 
foreclosure is constrained by legal and cultural barriers. Loans in low-income 
areas are generally small and transaction costs can form a substantial 
proportion of the total costs. Housing-finance institutions therefore have little 
incentive to lend to low-income groups.
2.8 Empirical Research
No empirical studies on government subsidy loan schemes similar to the BT 
Program could be found. Research on assessing the performance of 
government housing policies was discovered, but none have used the 
Balance Scorecard concepts and analytical tools in their assessments. 
The empirical research identified, is based on the upfront capital subsidy 
program invented by Chile in 1973.  The Chilean housing model was praised 
by USAID in the 1990’s as ‘best practice’ because it incorporated three 
elements namely private market provision, explicit targeting of the poor and 
transparency (Gilbert 2004). Allan Gilbert’s research provides useful insights 
for Namibia’s BT Program loan scheme. The research makes a comparative 
study on the success of implementing the capital subsidy program in Chile, 
Columbia and South Africa. 
The research paper by Gilbert ibid examines whether capital subsidies have 
reached the poor, whether they have provided satisfactory housing solutions 
and whether the policy demonstrates consistent weaknesses across the three 
countries. 
Evidence for the research is taken as a by-product of a research project 
undertaken by the British Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Global 
Governance Programme’ which focused to understand how housing policy 
experience is diffused between countries and how Washington has been 
involved.
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According to the findings of Alan Gilbert ibid, the capital subsidy model 
received many criticisms in all three countries, but research showed that the 
new model was perceived to be better than the previous systems. The 
general view about the capital subsidy program in all three countries is 
however one of mixed success.
The study found that the principal challenge to governments in the housing 
field is how to bridge the gap between substantial demand for housing and 
limited resources to satisfy that demand. The main challenges listed are the 
size of the task, the resources available for housing subsidy programs, target 
proliferation, and breath versus depth concerns. 
The size of the task highlights the reality that the housing deficits and 
therefore the housing problem is much bigger than what governments can 
deal with. For example, the housing deficit in 2001, for South Africa was 
estimated to be between 2 and 3 million units. (CDE 2001 quoted in Gilbert 
2004).
In terms of the available resources, none of the three countries have funded 
their housing programs very generously.  South Africa for instance spent less 
than 1% of its budget on housing (RSA, Department of Housing 199a: 17 
quoted in Gilbert 2004). According to Renaud, Third World governments 
typically spend 2% of central government expenditure on low income housing 
(Renaud 1999: 1 quoted in Gilbert 2004). 
In terms of target proliferation, all three countries aimed to achieve more than 
assisting the poor by improving access to homeownership and to improve the 
quality of housing stock. In Chile housing was redesigned to form part of the 
revolutionary new economic and social model. In Columbia, in addition to the 
having the same goals of Chile, the housing program was used to generate 
more employment while the  South Africa government used the housing 
subsidy program to generate employment and to  encourage the development 
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of black entrepreneurs. According to Gilbert 2004, target proliferation makes it 
more difficult to achieve the basic goals and complicates evaluation. 
The basic dilemma according to Gilbert ibid of any government is the breadth 
versus depth questions. The basic question in the housing sector remains 
how to maximize government expenditure in the housing sector? The 
government can decide to maximize the number of subsidies and accept a 
lower standard house or it could maintain a certain standard of house with 
fewer subsidies. There is therefore a basic trade-off between the number of 
subsidies and the quality of the final housing products. In the beginning Chile 
was determined to maintain standards and therefore over time fewer 
subsidies were given to the better-off for proper housing. The accuracy of the 
targeting however, improved greatly after 1990. In Columbia, beneficiaries 
received small subsidies to increase the number of subsidies, but these small 
subsides were backed-up by the offer of credit. In Columbia, subsidies to build 
informal housing were only embraced fully in 1994 after the new government 
realized that few subsidies went to the poor. South Africa on the other-hand 
committed itself to maximizing the number of subsidies and adopted a formal 
sector housing approach. South Africa only accepted the need for aided self-
help with the adoption of the ‘Peoples Housing Process’ in 1998 (Gilbert ibid).  
Political conditions normally influenced the choice between breadth and depth 
of the housing program.
According to Gilbert 2004, there are a number of challenges in attempting to 
do too much with too little as evidence from the three countries show. 
Firstly, there is an immediate development of housing queues with the 
introduction of capital subsidies. The number of families who would like to 
receive a subsidy normally far exceeds the subsidies available. In Chile for 
example, the average wait for any subsidy is 15.6 years and the wait for a 
basic housing unit is 21.4 years. During the first phase of the capital subsidy 
program in Colombia, 73% of all the households in the country were eligible 
for subsidies. Families were expected to contribute a minimum of 5% of the 
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price of the house, a total of 150,000 families were waiting for approvals. In 
2000 while officials were denying the existence of a queue, 100,000 families 
were chasing after 3,300 subsidies. In South Africa the demand for subsidies 
also exceeds the supply. According to Merten, 221,000 families were on the 
waiting list, with 26,000 additional families joining each year  (Merten 1999, 
quoted in Gilbert 2004).
Secondly, the subsidies were generally targeted to poor families who wanted 
to become home owners. Qualifying households were also required to be 
nationals rather than foreigners. In addition there were special exclusions for 
each country. Chile targeted the ‘deserving poor’ by giving priority to those 
willing to save.  Columbia initially had the same criteria as Chile, but changed 
to reach those who were even poorer, but later changed back to the old 
system. Columbia also tried to focus on reaching women-headed households 
after 1998, but cancelled the program after it was too successful. Both Chile 
and Colombia have had real problems in reaching the poorest families 
because the poor could not maintain the savings record in Chile or could not 
access credit in Columbia. Building standards were also set very high and the 
poor families could not afford to buy houses (Gilbert ibid). South Africa on the 
other-hand promises the capital subsidy to virtually all families who earn less 
than R3,500. South Africa claims that over 92% of its subsidies granted went 
to households earning less than R1,500 per month. (RSA, Department of 
Housing 2001 quoted in Gilbert ibid)
The third challenge is the quality of the housing solution. According to Gilbert 
ibid, none of the three countries has managed to provide good quality 
housing. In Chile, who produced the most complete house, most of the homes 
were very small and the basic house in Santiago in 1990 was 33-34 m in 
extent. The average size rose in the 1990’s. In 1998 every family had only 9.3 
m per occupant (Nieto, 2000:38 quoted in Gilbert 2004). Other complaints of 
the quality of the house related to poor design, thinness of walls and 
premature deterioration. In Columbia there were complaints of the small plot 
sizes which measured 18.74 m (2.5 meters frontage by 7.5 meters deep). 
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Beneficiaries in South Africa have also criticized the quality of housing 
(Tomlinson 1999a quoted in Gilbert 2004). In the beginning, the average size 
of the units was only 25 m with no partitions. Later the Department of 
Housing has insisted that the floor size of state subsidized houses be a 
minimum of 30 m.
The fourth challenge relates to the location of subsidized housing. A common 
criticism in all three countries has been the poor location of subsidized 
housing far from the main centers of employment. 
The fifth challenge highlights the creation of slum neighborhoods. According 
to Gilbert ibid, the program is criticized to create neighborhoods that are 
unsafe and deteriorate quickly because of the grouping of poor households. 
Many of the new owners cannot afford to maintain the accommodation or pay 
municipal service fees. The small size of the new houses has also helped to 
destroy the concept of the extended family. Further, the real estate market 
barely functions as it is difficult to obtain mortgages to buy these houses. In 
South Africa many families have opted to move out of the neighborhoods as a 
result (Gilbert ibid). 
The six and final challenge highlighted by Gilbert ibid is access to credit. 
Faced by limited resources, all three governments committed themselves to 
improve the poor’s access to housing finance. Governments realized that 
subsidies are small and that proper houses can only be provided if credit 
supplements the subsidy. All three countries have faced problems in 
convincing the banks to lend to the poor. According to Gilbert 2004, most 
banks regard lending to the poor as both an unprofitable and problematical 
exercise (Gilbert ibid). According to Tomlinson (1999c) traditional mortgage 
bonds are inappropriate for low income consumers because of the absence of 
collateral combined with the limited disposable income of households 
(Tomlinson 1999c quoted in Gilbert ibid).
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Although the empirical study of Chile, Columbia and South Africa refers to the 
capital housing subsidy scheme which is different from the subsidized loan 
scheme of the BT Program, the lessons in the three countries provide insights 
that can improve the BT Program in Namibia. The issues and challenges 
highlighted in the empirical study will be used to develop a framework to 
assess the performance of the BT Program loan scheme.
Taking a closer look at the individual housing capital subsidy scheme in South 
Africa, Huchzermeyer 2001 highlights that the scheme is a result of intense 
negotiations within the National Housing Forum from 1992-1994. According to 
Huchzermeyer ibid, housing policy at the time focused on resolving tensions 
between product and process in an attempt to combine the dominant position 
of the private sector for the commodification of housing with the people-
centered housing process advocated by the democratic movement 
(Huchzermeyer 2001:303).  
Housing in South Africa is regarded as a basic need and the right for access 
to adequate housing is protected by the Constitution (Huchzermeyer 
2001:305). Adequate housing is defined by the Housing White Paper of 1994 
as “viable, socially and economically integrated communities, situated in 
areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities as well as health, 
educational and social amenities, within which all South Africa’s people will 
have access to
 A permanent residential structure and with secure tenure, ensuring 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and
 Potable water, adequate sanitary facilities including waste disposal and 
domestic electricity sup[ply” (Department of Housing, 1994, p.12)
This definition is wider than a top structure and in line with the broad definition 
of adequate shelter put forward by the Habitat Agenda. 
Adequate housing in South Africa is the responsibility of the state according to 
the constitution. To address the housing need, the government created the 
38
once-off product-linked capital subsidy. The subsidy requires home-ownership 
of a standardized housing unit. The model created large-scale developments 
of uniform, free standing, mostly one-roomed houses with individual freehold 
title in standardized township layouts located on the urban peripheries 
(Huchzermeyer 2001:306). The private sector promotes this model as a 
means for the poor to escape he poverty cycle while others hold that the 
model creates poverty traps. 
According to Huchzermeyer ibid there is a gradual shift away from the 
once-off capital project–linked subsidy model producing free-standing houses 
on individual plots with freehold tenure(Huchzermeyer 2001:305).  Firstly, 
private sector induced shifts focus on providing conventional mortgage 
finance to the low income groups through agreements with government and 
banks. These agreements led to the formation of the National Housing 
Finance Corporation and the National Urban Reconstruction and Housing 
Agency. Private sector top-up funding is however still not accessible to the 
low income groups. The proposal from the private sector is now to mobilize 
savings at the community level in the lowest income groups as opposed to 
forcing banks to extend conventional financing. Individual savings history 
should then determine eligibility for subsidies and loans (Huchzermeyer 
2001:313).
Secondly, shifts away from the once-off capital project–linked subsidy model 
are initiated by the mass democratic movement consisting of organized labour 
with its constituency of formally employed low-income sector pushing for 
combining government subsidies with private sector finance to allow for longer 
term financial support for affordable housing. The ideal vehicle is seen as a 
national housing bank or housing “parastatal” (Huchzermeyer ibid).
Lastly shifts are initiated by the Homeless People’s Federation supported by 
the People’s Dialogue and by an international movement which encourages 
the poor to mobilize their own resources and find their own housing solution. 
This approach known as the People’s Housing Process (PHP) has been 
39
associated with sustainable housing. According to Huchzermeyer 2001 the 
People’s Housing Process could officially access the portion of the capital 
subsidy earmarked for the top structure only in May 1998.  The ministry is 
also placing more reliance on the process of people building their own houses 
while government will focus on providing people with the necessary 
infrastructure (Huchzermeyer ibid).
2.9 Case Studies
2.9.1 The Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP)
Most of the housing policies and interventions in the West, Europe and the 
Developing countries are based on the Experimental Housing Allowance 
Program (EHAP) that was implemented by the US in 1973 and ran until 1982 
when its final evaluation was completed. The main goal of EHAP was to 
determine whether low-income families in need of decent housing might be 
better serviced if they received housing allowances – direct cash payment for 
housing than if they were offered subsided housing built by or for the 
government (Renaud 1999: 151). 
The core finding of the experiment is that beneficiaries do not have housing 
problems as much as they have an income problem (Renaud 1999: 151).
Another important finding by the experiment is that demand-side housing 
allowances are better than supply-side subsidies from a social and economic 
perspective for three reasons. Firstly, the ‘deadweight losses’ in consumer 
welfare were lower for housing allowances compared to public housing 
because the programs are experienced by beneficiaries much more as 
income-transfer programs than housing programs. Secondly, losses in 
consumer sovereignty are lower because tenant satisfaction are lower when 
given access to a specific housing unit than when they can exercise choice of 
rental units with the help of a housing allowance. Thirdly, and finally the 
resource costs of providing units under the supply-side program was found to 
be considerably larger than under the demand-side program(Renaud 1999: 
151).
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A number of other key findings from the experiment were also substantial.  
Firstly, public housing programs were inequitable and wasteful because the 
units serviced only a fraction of the population eligible for housing assistance 
while the subsidized units were more expensive to build and maintain than 
similar units in the private housing market (Renaud 1999: 151). Secondly, 
some poor households spend half or more of their income for housing while 
other chose to live in inexpensive and inadequate dwellings. Consequently, 
budgetary relief is probably a higher priority for low income households than 
better housing (Renaud 1999: 152). Thirdly, imbalances in supply and 
demand tend to be reflected in vacancy rates rather than remedied by price 
changes.
According to Renaud 1999, these findings are also applicable to developing 
countries where the key findings of the EHAP were extended by the 
implementation of site specific experiments in developing countries. Although, 
the context differ with regard to the availability of financial resources, the scale 
of needs and the availability of skills, the key findings of the EHAP program 
were confirmed and extended in experiments conducted in Developing 
Countries (Renaud 1999).  
2.9.2 Grameen Bank (GB) Bangaldesh
The GB presents an excellent case study on how to provide credit to low-
income groups. The bank won the Noble Peace price in 2006 for its concept 
and methodology of micro-credit. GB was started by Professor Muhammed 
Yunus in Bangladesh and literally means village bank. Bangladesh had an 
estimated 150.49 million people in 2011 according to the World Bank. GB is 
based on action research conducted during 1976 to 1979 and in 1983 the 
banking project was converted into an independent bank. The banking system 
is based on mutual trust, accountability and creativity. The purpose of the 
project was to start a credit delivery system to provide banking services 
targeted at the poor (Grameen Bank 2011). 
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The bank has the following objectives (Grameen Bank 2011):
- “Extend banking facilities to poor men and women;
- Eliminate the exploitation of the poor by money lenders;
- Create opportunities for self-employment for the vast multitude of 
unemployed people in rural Bangladesh;
- Bring the disadvantaged, mostly the women from the poorest 
households, within the fold of an organizational format which they can 
understand and manage by themselves; and
- Reverse the age-old vicious circle of "low income, low saving & low 
investment", into virtuous circle of "low income, injection of credit, 
investment, more income, more savings, more investment, more 
income".
In October 2011, the bank had 8.349 million borrowers of which 97% are 
women. The bank has 2,565 branches covering more than 97% of all the 
villages in Bangladesh. Borrowers of the bank own 90% of its shares while 
government owns the remaining 10% (Grameen Bank 2011).
The bank requires no collateral and does not wish to take any borrower to the 
court of law in case of default. Although the borrower must belong to a five 
member group, the group is not required to give any guarantee. Repayment 
responsibility solely rest with the individual borrower (Grameen Bank 2011).
Total loans since inception amounts to U$11.35 billion and 10.11 billion is 
repaid. Outstanding loans amount to U$968.31.  Between November 2010-
October 2011, the bank disbursed U$1480.53 million which is on average 
U$123.38 million per month. The bank has a recovery rate of 97%. All loans 
are financed from the bank’s deposits while 56% of the deposits at the bank 
came from the banks own borrowers. The deposits are 145% of outstanding 
loans. 
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The bank does not receive any donor funds or outside borrowings since 1998. 
GB earned profits every year since its establishment except in 1983, 1991 
and 1992. During 2010, the total revenue of the bank was U$252,05 million 
and total expenditure U$241.29. The largest component of expenditure was 
interest payments on deposits comprising 54%.  GB earned a profit of 
U$10.76 million in 2010 (Grameen Bank 2011).
GB has a number of different products including housing loans, micro 
enterprise loans, scholarships, education loans the beggars program and the 
social venture capital fund. What is of interest in this paper is the housing 
loans.  The housing loans operate since 1984. The maximum loan in 2011 
was U$354 to be paid over 5 years in weekly installments at an interest rate of 
8%. Since the introduction of the housing loans, more than 690,737 houses 
were constructed at an average cost of U$181.50. In total U$211.21 million 
was disbursed for housing loans. During November 2010 and October 2011 a 
total of 4,482 houses have been constructed with housing loans totaling 
U$0.69 million (Grameen Bank 2011). 
According to Morduch, part of the success of GB has been built around 
subsidies and it explains why similar models of banks have not sprung up 
around the world (Morduch 1999).  Subsidization is critical during the start-up 
phases of the bank, but once the bank has matured the need for subsidies 
recede as shown by GB. 
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2.10 Housing Policy Lessons Learnt
Following the literature review, it is essential to identify a few key success 
factors for national housing solutions. 
Targeted Policy:
Firstly, the policy must be focused and clearly identify the target groups. An 
important realization with the understanding of how housing markets work is 
that assistance in one sub-market cannot be contained in the specific sub-
market. However, it is critical that the direct beneficiaries fall within the target 
group. 
Appropriate Scale:
Secondly, housing policies must deliver at an appropriate scale and sufficient 
resources must be available to deliver at the required scale. The policy must 
at least deliver sufficient units to address the annual demand. This is where 
the tension of product versus process comes to the fore. History has shown 
that, an over emphasis on technology and product to deliver units in mass like 
the public housing programs has failed for various reasons as discussed 
earlier, but in particular because financial resources were scarce while the 
targeted beneficiaries could not afford the units.
Enabling Environment:
Thirdly, to be successful the housing policy must involve and empower the 
targeted beneficiaries. The policy must draw on the resources of the poor in 
particular their skills. The policy must create an ‘enabling environment’ to 
create the necessary economic, financial, legal and institutional environment 
required to support the housing sector. In particular, the government must 
focus on the demand side interventions to ensure that assistance go directly 
to the individual. 
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Quality of Units:
Fourthly, the policy must deliver units that create value for money. Units must 
be completed and must be of sufficient size to meet the needs of 
beneficiaries.  Further, the units must be located close to work, recreation and 
social facilities within healthy neighborhoods, with diversified housing stock 
and access to basic services namely water, electricity, sewer and social 
facilities. Beneficiaries should also have a choice to own or rent units and 
should have security of tenure.
Policy Sustainability:
Funds should not be limited to government funding only. Private sector and 
community financing must be mobilized. Access to credit is critical for the 
overall success of the housing solution.
Operational efficiency:  
Grameen bank has proven that the long, complex operational procedures can 
be replaced by an operational system that can be understood by low-income 
groups. Risk management practices must also be suited for the targeted 
group.
Capacity to learn:
Over the years housing policies have adjusted as institutions learnt what 
works and what does not. It is important that the policy is reviewed on a 
regular basis to ensure that it remains relevant.
2.11 BTP Critical Success Factors
The critical success factors identified for general housing policy is also 
applicable on the BT Program. These critical success factors form the basis of 
assessment for the BT Program within the four main perspectives of the 
Balance Scorecard. Some of these critical success factors will be expanded to 
agree with the structure of the Balance Scorecard.
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Targeted Policy:
Firstly, the degree of focus of the BTP will be assessed by looking at the 
target group and who actually benefits from the program.
Appropriate Scale:
Secondly, the BTP will be assessed if it has clearly defined the scale of the 
housing problem within the BTP target group. The rate of delivery of the BTP 
will be assessed if it is adequate to meet the required annual demand within 
the target group and if it tackles the existing housing backlog within the target 
group
Enabling Environment:
Thirdly, the BTP will be assessed on the level of involvement and 
empowerment of the targeted beneficiaries. The BTP must create an 
‘enabling environment’ that must draw on the resources of the poor in 
particular their skills. 
Quality of Units: 
Fourthly, the BTP will be assessed on the quality of the units it delivers 
looking at the level of completion, size of the units and the level of tenure 
security the units offer. The research will also assess the location and 
accessibility of BTP houses to municipal and social services such as water, 
sewer, electricity, roads; economic opportunities like jobs and social and 
recreational services such as schools, hospitals and parks. 
Policy Sustainability: 
The BTP will be assessed for sustainability and the availability of finance 
outside government funding especially looking at the availability of private 
sector and community financing. In addition, the research will assess if the 
target group of the BTP can afford the products offered by the BTP.
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Operational efficiency:  
The operational procedures of the BTP will further be assessed to determine 
its complexity and level of understanding by low-income groups and if risk 
management practices are suited for BTP beneficiaries. 
Capacity to learn:
Finally, the research will assess if the BTP learns from past experiences and 
adapts to changing circumstances to remain relevant.
2.12 Contribution to Research
The BTP is a supply side intervention that aims to follow an enabling 
approach focused on communities hence the name ‘Built-Together’. However, 
different municipalities implement the program differently and the result is that 
BTP interventions vary from the typical supply side oriented council housing to 
the pro-poor people’s housing process. In Windhoek, the people’s process is 
promoted as BTP loans are limited to groups. Households must form part of a 
group to qualify for BTP loans. The BTP is further a subsidized loan program, 
unlike the capital subsidy programs that are promoted in South Africa, Chile 
and Columbia.
The research will test the theory that government housing programs normally 
do not deliver adequate, affordable houses at an appropriate scale that meet 
the needs of the target group. The critical success factors for housing delivery 
will therefore be tested on the products the BTP deliver. The research will 
therefore look at issues of focus, social acceptability, affordability, access to 
basic services and the sustainability of the BTP and how it compares to the 
general view of government housing programs. 
Secondly, it is the first time that the Balance Scorecard is used in assessing 
housing policy and strategy. It appears that the use of Balance Scorecard 
concepts and analytical tools will add significantly to the focus and 
effectiveness of housing policy in general. In particular the Balance Scorecard 
conceptual system can contribute to the improvement of the BTP in Namibia.
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- CHAPTER 3 –
3 RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 Introduction:
Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of the theory of research, it then goes into 
discussing the research method and proposing a design and a measurement 
tool to assess the success of the BTP loan scheme. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion on the execution of the research.
3.2 Theory of Research
In designing the research, it is necessary to quickly divert to the difficulties in 
adopting the overall approach to test the hypothesis. There are basically two 
dominant approaches in social science research, namely quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Social science is defined as the scientific study of 
human behavior (Punch 2005: 7). The aim of social science according to 
Punch ibid is to build explanatory theory about people and their behavior.
Research is defined as ‘organized common sense’ (Punch 2005: 7). Empirical 
research refers to the collection of observable real world data both 
quantitatively (numbers) and qualitatively (not numbers) (ibid). 
Quantitative and qualitative approaches are widely used today to explain 
people and their behavior and there is an increasing tendency to combine 
these approaches (Punch 2005: 1). It is therefore critical to have an 
understanding of both approaches in informing research. 
Quantitative methods dominated before the 1960’s and focused on replicating 
the scientific method of doing research. The objective of the scientific method 
in social sciences is to use theory to explain data and use data to build and 
test theory (Punch 2005). The overall approach of the quantitative method has 
a problem statement, a hypothesis (optional) that has to be accepted or 
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rejected, research questions, observations, theory, prediction, experiment and 
measurement. Quantitative research questions are prespecified and follow a 
tightly structured design (ibid).  Data to be collected is numerical and 
measurement systems use counting or scaling to give data a numerical 
structure. Data analysis use statistical methods to categorize, describe and 
explain data. Practical and ethical limitations of the experiment led the 
development of the quasi-experimental and the non-experimental situations 
(ibid). However, the quasi-experimental and non-experimental designs 
continue to apply the scientific design principles. 
In contrast to the quantitative approach, the qualitative approach has multiple 
methodologies and research practices (Punch 2005: 134).These research 
methodologies and practices include case studies, ethnography, grounded 
theory and action research. The objectives and research environment will 
determine which methodology is used in the research. The main data 
collection tool for qualitative research is the interview. Interviews can be 
structured, semi-structured or unstructured depending on the aims of the 
research. The overall approach of qualitative research recognize that there is 
a continuum of possibilities to structure research and the structure chosen 
depends on the objective of the research i.e if it is theory generation or theory 
verification. Research questions are general and unfolding. Data are 
unstructured in the beginning in particular when it’s collected and categories 
and codes unfold as data are analyzed. Structure is therefore introduced at a 
later stage. Data can consist of numbers, words and other observation 
material depending on the situation and the phenomenon under study. 
Various analytical methods for qualitative data exists including coding, 
memoing and discourse analysis.
In selecting a data collection method, it is necessary to give a brief overview 
of the methods that can be considered for this research.
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Experimental Designs:
The experiment involves the physical manipulation of variables for research 
purposes using controlled comparison groups (Punch 2005). In its simplest 
form, the experiment has two groups, the treatment group and the control 
group. The independent variable is manipulated in the treatment group while 
nothing or something different is done to the control group. The groups are 
then compared based on the dependent variable to conclude that the 
differences between the treatment and control groups are a result of the 
treatment administered or the independent variable (ibid).   The experiment 
takes the variables out of their natural occurring environment to isolate and 
test cause and effect relationships of the variables under study. A key 
assumption of the experimental design is that the comparison groups are the 
same except for the different exposure to the treatment variable. Historically, 
the core of the scientific method for data collection was the experiment and 
measurement.
“The experiment was seen as the basis for establishing cause-effect 
relationships between variables, and its variables had to be measured”
(Punch 2005: 65). The cause-effect relationships meant that there was a 
dependent variable, control variable and an independent variable on which 
data was collected. According to Punch ibid the conceptual framework of the 
experiment shows the structure of the study in terms of these variables. The 
experiment looks forward from the independent variable to the dependent 
variable, namely from causes to effects and ask the question: what is the 
effect of this cause?
Quasi-experimental and Non-experimental Designs:
Quasi-experimental designs came about primarily because of the practical 
and ethical limitations of the experiment (Punch 2005). The logic of the 
experiment was however still applied. 
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Quasi-experimental designs are applied between naturally occurring 
treatment groups where comparison of variables are possible to study the 
relationship between variables. A key requirement of the quasi-experimental 
design is that the boundaries of the naturally occurring groups are clear cut. 
Comparison groups are not specifically setup for research and therefore other 
variables that can influence outcomes cannot be eliminated in the design. 
Because variables are not isolated in the design, statistical methods are used 
to approximate the experiment and isolate the variables using correlation and 
regression as its main features.
In non-experimental designs, comparison groups are not easily 
distinguishable   and the natural variation in the independent variable is 
studied. According to Punch ibid, the researcher has little control over when to 
measure outcome variables in relation to the exposure to the treatment 
variable. Statistical methods are also used to approximate the experiment and 
isolate the variables using correlation and regression as its main features.
Correlation surveys look backward, from the dependent variable to the 
independent variable or from effects to causes. The key question according to 
Punch ibid is: what are the causes of this effect?
Case Study
A case study although mostly associated with qualitative technique, can also 
be quantitative and is therefore briefly discussed as it also informs the 
selected method of research. Case studies according to Punch ”is more 
strategy than method” (Punch 2005:144) The case study studies one case in 
detail in order to develop a full understanding of the case. According to Punch 
ibid, the purpose of the case study is to understand the case in detail in its 
natural environment taking full account of its complexity and context. It further 
aims to have a holistic outlook, focused to preserve and understand the 
overall case. 
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A case is defined as a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded 
context and can be an individual, a small group, an organisation, a community 
or a nation (Punch ibid).  A case, according to Punch ibid can further be a 
role, a decision, a policy, a process, or an incident or event.
According to Punch ibid, the four characteristics of a case study are:
1 Firstly, the case is a bounded system;
2 Secondly, the case is a case of something;
3 Thirdly, a case study preserves the wholeness, unity and integrity of 
the case.
4 Fourthly, the case study can have multiple sources of data and a 
number of data collection methods.
3.3 Research Method
Research design is the basic plan for the research and has four major 
questions according to Punch 2005 namely:
1) Following what strategy?




Research strategy deals with one primary question which informs the overall 
design namely is it quantitative or qualitative or is it a combination? 
Depending on the answer to the first question, the structure and design of 
research questions and the data to be collected and the method of collection 
will be determined. “Quantitative questions require quantitative methods to 
answer them, and qualitative questions require qualitative methods to answer 
them” (Punch 2005: 19). 
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This research follows a quantitative approach, but with a mix of qualitative 
approaches where required. The research will therefore take a snapshot of a 
particular situation at a particular time and will collect and analyze quantitative 
and qualitative data primarily using statistical methods to describe the data in 
order to develop a profile of beneficiary households and a profile of the 
administrative issues in the daily operations of the BTP. 
1) Within what framework?
Framework refers to conceptual status of the variables being studied and their 
relationship to each other (Punch 2005: 64).
The purpose of this research is to compile a status or descriptive profile of the 
beneficiary households while having a proper understanding of the 
administrative issues involved in the daily administration of the BTP.
No inferences will be drawn to the entire population and the research is not 
aiming to identify causal relationships to develop predictive models.
2) From Whom will data be collected?
Data will be collected from two sources namely BTP beneficiary households 
and key informants from institutions involved in the daily administration of the 
BTP.
A detailed analysis of beneficiary households will be done in order to compile 
a status profile of beneficiary households to assess the success of the BTP.
Key informant surveys are conducted to collect data about the BTP from 
institutions involved in administering the program. A key-informant of the BTP 
system is defined as someone knowledgeable about the BTP system and 
involved daily in implementing the BTP system. Informants were defined by 
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the institution at which they are employed, the nature of what they do and 
their respective positions.
3) How will the data be collected?
Data will be collected from a non-probabilistic sample of the population using 
the status survey and from key informant structured surveys.
Sampling is the process of selecting a representative subset of observations 
from the population (Wegner 2001:170) All research, qualitative and 
quantitative involves sampling as the research cannot study everyone, 
everywhere doing everything (Punch 2005). According to Neal, the 
interpretation of the results of a survey hinges on the method of sampling that 
was used in gathering the data (Neal 1986:49). Wegner ibid lists two basic 
methods of sampling namely non-probability sampling methods and 
probability sampling methods. 
Non-probability sampling methods are defined as any sampling method in 
which the observations are not selected randomly. Wegner ibid lists three 
types of non-probability sampling techniques namely convenience sampling, 
judgment sampling, and quota sampling. Each of the non-probability sampling 
methods has their advantages and disadvantages listed in Neal 1986. The 
basic difficulty with non-probability sampling is they are not representative and 
inferences drawn to the population are questionable (Neal 1986).
Probability sampling on the other hand includes sample selection procedures 
where the observation to be included in a sample have been selected on a 
purely random basis from the population (ibid). It is only when samples are 
randomly selected that sampling errors can be measured to establish the 
representativeness of the sample. Inferential statistics can only be applied to 
data collected from a probability sample where the sampling error can be 
statistically measured (ibid). 
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“The logic of quantitative sampling is that the researcher analyses data 
collected from the sample, but wishes in the end to make statements about 
the whole target population from which the sample is drawn” (Punch 
2005:101). The findings of the sample are about the sample, but through 
inferential statistics the findings of the sample are extrapolated or generalize 
to the population (ibid). The sampling plan should fit in with the logic of the 
research questions. If the research questions require representativeness, the 
probability sampling procedures should be employed (ibid).
Traditionally, mathematically sophisticated sampling plans were regarded as 
critical in research design, but it seems to be no longer so important because 
of the growth of interest in qualitative methods, a swing from large samples in 
quantitative studies, and the growing practical problem of obtaining access to 
large and neatly configured samples required by sophisticated sampling plans 
(Punch 2005: 101). “Very often indeed, the researcher must take whatever 
sample is available, and the incidence of convenience samples (where the 
researcher takes advantage of an accessible situation which happens to fit 
the research context and purposes is increasing” (Punch 2005:101).  
Sampling principles however remain important as it remains a key decision-
making tool in quantitative research and because the principles give a useful 
model to sample selection.  According to Punch (ibid) there are three 
questions to be addressed irrespective of the sampling method:
1) How big will the sample be, and why?
2) How will it be chosen and why?
3) What claims will be made for its representativeness?
The data collection method is primarily informed by the information to be 
collected. The primary data collection method to be used is the survey method 
which is a non-experimental method and is used to collect quantitative and 
qualitative data from the sample selected by the research. According to Punch 
2005, there are three different survey methods namely the status survey, the 
correlation survey and the longitudinal survey. Firstly, the status survey, also 
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known as the normative survey or the descriptive survey has the objective of 
describing the sample in terms of proportions and percentages of people who 
respond to questions. Secondly the correlation survey is used to identify and 
study relationships between variables using conceptual frameworks similar to 
those used in experimental design (Punch 2005). Variables will therefore be 
conceptualized as independent, control and dependent. Thirdly longitudinal 
studies are a correlation study that makes recurring observations of the same 
variables over long periods of time.
The three primary data survey techniques are the distributed questionnaire, 
phone surveys and systematic interviews. According to Neale 1986, the 
systematic personal interview is an effective technique for reducing some of 
the biases created by the distributed questionnaire and phone surveys. 
However, a systematic sampling plan is required to provide adequate data. 
According to Neale ibid, the personal interview is the preferred technique for 
gathering survey data.
The research employs a non-probability sampling method, accidental 
sampling namely snowball sampling by using contacts to identify the first 
households to be surveyed and using study subjects to recruit additional 
households for survey. A non-experimental survey technique using the status 
survey (descriptive survey) is selected to describe the sample in terms of 
proportions and percentages of people who respond to questions. The focus 
of the analysis is to develop a detailed profile of the characteristics of the BTP 
clients at a particular point in time and not to predict variables.
In determining the sample size, the key question asked was ‘How many 
responses are required to compile a descriptive profile of beneficiaries of the
BTP?’ The follow-up question of course is, how representative is this sample 
of the population? Sample size and representativeness is dependent on the 
population size, the required confidence level and how much variance is 
expected in the population. 
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Since the research is a status survey and the population is expected to have 
small variations, a small sample size is acceptable. In a resource (time, 
money) constrained world, there is always a dilemma between having 
complete data (a number of questions) per unit of analysis versus having a 
number of households with limited data (few questions).  Qualitative surveys 
are purpose driven, and because the research questions and hypothesis 
required detailed information about each household on four different 
perspectives, the choice was made to collect detailed information about the 
households as opposed to collecting data on one or two variables on a 
number of households to meet the criterion representativeness. A detailed 
survey of each household was therefore employed to obtain detailed 
information to understand the household in depth. A proper description of the 
characteristics of the BTP client is essential to understand the significance of 
the program in the delivery of affordable housing. The research is not aiming 
to draw inferences of the population and a limited sample size is adequate to 
draw a complete profile of the sampled households.
There are a number of practical difficulties in working in low-income 
settlements highlighted by Mooya 2009. Despite these difficulties, 
experiences and perspectives of clients in housing programs are critical in 
ensuring that programs and policies best meet client needs.
To apply quantitative methods in informal settlements by observing 
phenomena independently as a researcher is in short simply impossible. 
Human behavior and responses cannot be reduced to a deterministic 
mathematical model. However, the proposed method does present a structure 




In determining the success of the BTP we need to develop a measurement 
tool to assess the performance of the program objectively. Measurement is 
defined as the process of using numbers to link concepts to indicators when a 
continuum is involved (Punch 2005: 87).The measurement system starts with 
defining what is successful performance, selecting measures and indicators 
for measuring successful performance and finally obtaining empirical 
information for the indicators.
The balance scorecard was used as an analytical framework for the BTP 
because of its versatility. The history, applications and the applicability of the 
Balance Scorecard as a measurement tool was already discussed in 
Chapter 1. The indicators for success for the BTP program were derived from 
the literature review in Chapter 2.
The BS was used as a tool to assess the achievements of the BT Program 
from the perspective of the Ministry of Regional and Local Government, 
Housing and Rural Development. As highlighted above, the objectives and 
measurements for the scorecard were derived from the critical success 
factors for housing policies identified under the literature review. Targets were 
identified from historical performance or industry standards.
Critical success factors identified are targeted policy, appropriate scale of 
delivery, enabling environment, quality of units, policy sustainability, 
operational efficiency and capacity to learn. These critical success factors 
were structured according to the Balance Scorecard and measures and 
targets were identified for each success factor. 
The Balance Scorecard will ensure that the BTP is assessed on critical 




The financial perspective addresses the concerns of the ministry and asks key
questions to satisfy central government.  
Objectives to be achieved under the financial perspectives are adequate scale 
of delivery, value for money, maximization of available funds and achieving 
program sustainability.
B) Customer:
The customer perspective addresses the concerns of Local Authorities (LA’s) 
and Regional Councils (RC’s) who are the customers of the line ministry.
Objectives to be achieved are the creation of an enabling environment and 
beneficiary satisfaction.
c) Internal Processes:
The internal process focuses firstly on the operational processes of the 
ministry to deliver grants in an efficient and effective manner and secondly on 
ensuring that grants allocated are used for intended purposes and not 
miss-allocated. 
Objectives to be achieved are efficient and effective loan application 
processes and the minimization of risk.
d) Learning and Growth:
Learning and Growth focuses firstly on the ability of the ministry to focus and 
learn from the implementation of the BT Program and secondly on the 
capacity of the ministry to review and implement the learning’s.
Objectives to be achieved are a learning organization and adequate capacity 
of the ministry for optimal functioning.
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Table: 3.1 Proposed Balance Scorecard
Theme Objective Measurement Target Comments
Financial 
Perspective
“ If we 
Succeed, 
how will we 
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Process should be 
supported
Adequate Units should Units must be well 
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Yes/No To ensure timely reports
3.5 Research Execution
In answering our research questions and testing the hypothesis, the research 
will collect information from households selected from snowball sampling and 
key informants selected from institutions responsible for implementing the 
BTP in Windhoek as discussed under the research method. 
In conducting the survey, the unit of study was defined as the household as 
the decision making unit. The population is defined as the “the total target 
group who would, in the ideal world, be the subject of the research, and about 
whom one is trying to say something” (Punch 2005: 101). The population for 
the purposes of this research is therefore defined as all the households who 
received BTP loans within the boundaries of the City of Windhoek. In 2012 the 
Windhoek municipality had 1,054 beneficiaries while the SDFN/NHAG had 
615 beneficiaries. The total population for the study is therefore 1,669 
households.
The sample is defined as the actual group who are included in the study, and 
from who the data are collected (ibid). In this research, as previously 
discussed, the households were selected using the snowball sampling 
method. Households were surveyed using the status survey technique to 
collect detailed information per household in order to compile a profile of the 
households sampled. 
The size of the sample was determined based on the detail to be collected 
from each household to assess each of the measurement indicators of 
success identified in the Balance Scorecard.  Instead of collecting data about 
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one or two measurements of success from a representative sample, the 
choice was made to collect information on all indicators from each household 
in the sample. Households were personally surveyed to ensure that questions 
are adequately understood and answered. Because of the number of 
indicators to be measured, it was too expensive and too time consuming to 
have a large sample of the defined population. The data collected from the 
sample can therefore not be inferred to the entire population. The data is 
however complete per household and therefore gives a good descriptive 
profile of the sampled households.
There are basically two categories of household beneficiaries operating within 
the confines of Windhoek. Firstly, households who belong to groups 
administered and supported by the Windhoek Municipality and secondly,
households who form part of groups administered and supported by the 
NHAG/SDFN. In order to develop a profile of the average beneficiary of the 
BTP, the sample of households for survey was stratified into two groups. The 
first group was selected from beneficiaries where the City of Windhoek was 
the loan grantor and the second group where the NHAG/SDFN was the loan 
grantor. The assumption was that the two groups might have different results 
and perspectives on the success of the BT Program as a result of different 
experiences with the BT loan processes. The target was to survey at least 15 
households from the City of Windhoek groups and 15 households from SDFN 
groups bringing the target of the total number of households to be surveyed to 
30. In selecting the households to be surveyed, snowball sampling was 
employed as alluded to earlier. Households were selected where household 
heads were present and willing to take part in the survey. 
Approval for the survey, interview questionnaires and consent form was 
received from the University’s Ethics Committee before the survey started. 
Officials from the different institutions namely SDFN/NHAG, City of Windhoek 
and the Ministry of Regional Local Government, Housing and Rural 
Development were identified for personal interviews by the researcher.  
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Discipline and consistency of collecting empirical data remains a key 
requirement in both data collection methods (Punch 2005). In conducting the 
surveys and interviews extreme care was taken to remain objective in the 
interviews and the surveys. 
Precaution was taken by drawing-up structured surveys and semi-structured 
interviews asking short, simple, and clearly worded questions as 
recommended by Punch (ibid). The survey and interview questionnaires start 
with simple and demographic questions to help respondents get started. As 
far as possible questions were asked with dichotomous (yes/no) answers
while open-ended questions were used cautiously to have some control over 
the possible responses.  Survey and interview questionnaires were tested on 
people with knowledge on the BT Program before the final questionnaires 
were produced. Questions were focused on finding data on the effectiveness 
of the BT Program in delivering adequate housing to low-income households. 
The researcher understands that his previous exposure to the BT program 
and the people involved in the program will influence the research. A 
complete audit trail will be available by keeping survey and interview records.
The signed consent form was presented before a household was surveyed or 
an administrator was interviewed. The consent form and the detailed survey 
questionnaire are attached as Appendix A and B.
Although time was taken to explain the purpose of the survey, some 
beneficiaries simply refused, sometimes very aggressively to complete the 
survey forms. In particular households were very suspicious, with many 
questions as to the purpose of the survey and how the data will be used. 
The planned 30 surveys were collected from the SDFN and City of Windhoek 
groups. All the respondents were household heads as it was a requirement for 
the respondent to take part in the survey.
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Table: 3.2 Response Rate
Response Rate
Count %
Population Size 1,669 100%
Sample Size 30 1.8%
Number of Responses 30 100%
The actual response rate as a percentage of the total population is relatively 
low, but as discussed earlier a conscious decision was made to have detailed 
survey information per household as opposed to having a large number of 
households with limited information per household. This choice was made to 
compile a full profile of the sampled households. In contrast, a representative 
sample of independent households could be drawn from the population, but 
detailed information per household would not have been available. 
Sampling and non-sampling errors can be expected because of the nature of 
the population under investigation.  Sampling errors can be expected because 
the researcher used snowball sampling to select the households. Surveys 
were only done where the household head was present and willing to be 
surveyed. Non sampling errors are also expected in the data set because of 
low literacy and language barriers of the sampled households.
Structured interviews were conducted with key informants from important
stakeholders namely the head of the Housing and Property Division at the 
City of Windhoek responsible for BT loans, the Regional Coordinator at NHAG 
and the Chief Control Officer Housing Administration from central 
government. Unfortunately names cannot be given to protect the identity of 
the officials interviewed. The local authority (City of Windhoek) and NHAG 
(National Housing Action Group) are implementers of the program while the 
Ministry of Regional, Local Government, Housing and Rural Development 
(MRLGH&RD) is the custodian. The structured interview questionnaire is





Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the empirical data collected through 
personal key informant interviews and household surveys. In deciding on the 
data to be collected and how it’s to be collected, the diagram below is used to 
structure the questions, define the information to be collected and to define 
the methods to collect the information.
Diagram: 4.1
The study intents to answer the questions if the government’s response is 
focused?; if the government is aware of the nature and scale of the housing 
problem?; are the rate of response and financial resources adequate?; can 
people in need of housing afford the products offered by the BTP? and finally 
does the housing solution offered by the BTP meet the requirements of 
adequate shelter?
Data was collected through personal structured interviews with key 
informants responsible in the implementation of the BTP and personal 
structured surveys of beneficiary households. Data collected focused on
testing our hypothesis that the BTP failed to realize the objective of providing 
adequate housing at an appropriate scale that is affordable to low income 
PUNCH 2005: 30
Research questions  
which meet the empirical 
criterion 
What data will answer these 
questions: quantitative; 
qualitative; both?
What Methods will give 
these data and answer 
these questions?
Research questions Research Methods
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groups in Namibia, because funds are inadequate while the process of 
allocation allows for misappropriation at local government level.
The chapter will end with formally assessing the BT Program using the 
Balance Scorecard and testing our hypothesis.
4.2 Administration and Operation of the BT Program
Data collected from key informants were collected on three themes of the 
Balance Scorecard namely learning and growth, financial perspective and 
internal processes and were reported in the same format. The primary 
objective of the key informant surveys is to understand the administration and 
the operations of the BTP along the main themes of the Balance Scorecard. 
This structure of key informant surveys is important as the implementation of 
the BTP differs from implementing institutions while the ministry responsible 
for the program only provides general guidelines. 
4.2.1 Ministry of Regional, Local Government, Housing and Rural 
Development
The purpose of the interview conducted with the Ministry of Regional, Local 
Government, Housing and Rural Development (MRLGH&RD) was not to 
assess the performance of the ministry, but to understand the operations and 
dynamics of the program.
Learning and Growth:
The Chief Control Officer Housing Administration at the Ministry of Regional, 
Local Government, Housing and Rural Development (MRLGH&RD) was 
interviewed. She has been working at the division for 7 years providing 
administrative support to regional and local councils. 
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According to the Chief Control Officer, the Build Together Program was 
decentralized in 1998/1999 financial year and is now formally referred to as 
the Decentralized Built Together Program (DBTP). Government sees their 
role as to facilitate funds, provide support to authorities and monitor the 
sustainable implementation of the program.
There are 25 people involved in loan administration at the Directorate 
including administration, financial management and technical assistance. 
Financial Perspective:
According to the Chief Control Officer, for the 2012/2013 budget year the 
various regions and town councils applied for N$57.034 million to implement 
DBT loan scheme projects. The ministry approved N$30 million or 52.6% of 
the amount applied for. This translates into one thousand (1,000) BT houses 
based on an average loan size of N$30,000 for the entire country.
According to the Chief Control Officer, the DBT loan funds supplied by the 
ministry to the various regional and town councils are grants to the respective 
council. The only requirement by the ministry is that recipients report back on 
the application of the funds. No payback of the grant is expected. The 
councils in turn lend the money to approved beneficiaries who are required to 
pay back at low interest rates prescribed by the ministry. The idea is that the 
grants and repayments from beneficiaries will establish revolving funds in 
various localities to augment the direct grants from the ministry.
The ministry does not provide assistance to individual beneficiaries according 
to the Chief Control Officer. Assistance is given to regional and local councils 
and includes financial administration, professional assistance, assistance with 
municipal services and general administration services to ensure that 
operations and reports are within the guidelines of the ministry.
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The ministry only approves funds where councils have properly completed 
Project Identification Reports and where councils have a dedicated bank 
account for the DBT revolving fund. In addition, Councils must have allocated 
land on which the houses will be built and there must be satisfactory progress 
on previous projects.
According to the Chief Control Officer, the loans are limited to individuals who 
are older than 21 years earning between N$100 –N$3000. Individuals older 
than 50 years need a co-applicant and no formal employment is necessary. 
Loans between N$3,000 and a maximum of N$40,000 are available. The loan 
funds can also be used to buy land. The loan is repayable monthly over 20 
years. Interest rates start at 4% for loans up to N$34,000 and increases with 
0.5% for every additional N$1000 up to N$40,000 with the highest interest 
rate at 7%.
According to the Chief Control Officer, the previous financial system used by 
the ministry to collect basic loan data was shelved as the person who 
operated the system retired and no one else knew how to operate the system. 
A new system was purchased purposefully developed for the BT Program that
will be rolled-out to all regional and local councils.
According to the ministry, the group system of awarding BT loans has 
presented some problems in the past especially where members do not pay 
on time. The municipal accounts are in the name of the group and the group 
is compelled to pay. Municipalities are now advised to provide individual 
accounts even if a household belongs to a group.
Arrear accounts also present a problem when the current beneficiary wants to 
sell the house and move to another area. There are no waiting lists at the 
ministry, each year councils have to apply for funding. Funds are paid in a 
lump sum to the respective council.
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Internal Processes:
The ministry developed a procedures and a technical manual for the BT 
scheme and all councils are expected to comply with the manual.
The technical manual has different types of proposed houses with the 
respective quantities required to build the houses.  The smallest house 
measures 18m and the biggest 44.5m.  At 2009 prices the material for the 
small house was estimated at N$23,880 excluding labor and plot costs. The 
biggest house at March 2009 prices was estimated at N$43,068.13 excluding 
labor and the plot. The price for the 18m unit in November 2012 was 
N$33,022.50 and for the 44.5m N$61,401. The building plans and detailed 
quantity list with 2009 and 2012 pricing are attached as Appendix D.
Households can choose to accept the plans as is or they can modify. The 
respective council is responsible to ensure that the house is complete. There 
is no universal implementation system in place and different councils 
implement the BT Program differently. Therefore the scheme has mixed 
results. Some councils will take it on themselves to construct the houses and 
the beneficiaries will only move in, other councils disburse funds to groups 
who will organize and allocate the funds, some will pay funds directly in the 
beneficiary’s personal accounts, while others will only pay the labor part and 
pay suppliers for materials.
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4.2.2 NHAG/SDFN AND THE BT PROGRAM
Learning and Growth:
NHAG/SDFN was represented by the regional coordinator at NHAG (Namibia 
Housing Action Group) a not for profit organization providing technical support 
to the SDFN (Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia) who works with NHAG 
for 19 years providing technical support to low-income households.
He received structured in house training and attended short training courses 
in administering the BTP loan scheme. Training covered record keeping, 
customer care, financial literacy and loan administration.
According to the Regional Coordinator, NHAG has its own procedures within
the guidelines of the procedural and technical manuals adopted by the line 
ministry. The loans are run on excel and no specialized loan administration 
program is in place. All the essential loan information is supplied and 
manually kept by the beneficiary groups who report the information to the 
NHAG office who captures the information in excel. 
Only 2 people are involved in loan administration at NHAG’s office. 
Beneficiary groups are regarded as responsible for record keeping and 
administering the loans.
Financial Perspective:
According to the Regional Coordinator, NHAG applied for N$1,390 million 
during 2011/2012 financial year. Project identification reports were completed 
and they received positive feedback for funding to that amount from the 
ministry. The groups were then pre-financed by Shack Dwellers International 
(SDI) to speed-up implementation of the project.
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The total funds released for 2012 is N$5,262 million for new houses and 
N$1,542 million for extensions. This is funded by funds applied for from the 
ministry, an annual grant from the ministry and the revolving funds available 
from payments of previous loans disbursed. NHAG received a total of 
N$16.58 million since 1992 and benefited a total of 906 household across 
Namibia.
According to the Regional Coordinator, NHAG contributes to the program by 
providing pre-financing support, professional assistance, technical assistance 
with municipal services, assistance to source building materials and general 
administrative support.
Beneficiaries start repaying immediately when the loan is disbursed. The loan 
cannot be used for land. NHAG however does support groups to acquire land 
with savings and a separate loan.
The loans are not adjustable and are at a compounded interest rate of 5% for 
a loan up to N$30,000.  Loans are provided over 11 years for upgrading or 15 
years for a new house. 
Internal Processes:
There are 226 individuals organized in groups on the waiting list for 2012. 
Groups must first qualify by acquiring land before they are registered on the 
waiting list. Groups normally stay about a year on the waiting list.
NHAG does not assist individuals in applying for loans, only active saving 
groups that can prove that they saved regularly are assisted. They must have 
land and have visited other groups to be physically exposed to loan 
administration and the construction process before they qualify for a BT loan. 
The individual groups are also required to report twice a year to the national 
meeting of SDFN groups.
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About 90% of the groups are up to date with their loan repayments. The group 
administration is responsible for collecting, record keeping and depositing 
loan repayments. Members in arrears are first dealt with by the group 
administration before NHAG is consulted. NHAG will appoint professional 
debt collectors to collect the outstanding amounts when absolutely necessary. 
To date no house was repossessed.
Funds are disbursed to the groups into a bank account. There are no 
progress payments. Payments out of the group’s account are made to 
suppliers for material and to the group for labor.  The beneficiaries and NHAG 
/SDFN are responsible to ensure the houses are completed. NHAG has 2 
standard plans, a 20m house that can be extended to 32m depending on 
affordability.  
The building quote from ‘Build It’, a local building material supplier estimated 
the material for the 20m house at N$12,118.85 including 15% VAT on 12 
September 2012. The quote by Built-It excludes labor, bricks, building sand 
and building stone. Labor is estimated at N$3000, sand and stone N$4000, 
and bricks at N$1,200. Bricks are made by the group. The total cost for the 
small house will therefore be about N$20,318.85.
Diagram: 4.2 Big House : 20mÄ









Plate 1: Environment created by SDFN/NHAG Initiatives
4.2.3 CITY OF WINDHOEK AND THE BT PROGRAM: 
Learning and Growth:
The interview was conducted with the head of the Housing and Property 
Division at the City of Windhoek responsible for BT loans. He is engaged with 
the BT Program for more than 6 years.
According to the official, some training was provided by the City of Windhoek
and the line ministry on loan administration for the BT Program. A total of 6 
people are involved in the loan administration process, four people in the 
properties section and two in the Finance Department. Additional support is 
provided by the Community Development Department and the building 
inspectors to provide training to the groups and inspect building progress.
Financial Perspective:
The loan application process is based in Excel while the loan disbursement 
and receipt payments are run on CoW (City of Windhoek) financial system.
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CoW did not apply for funding for the 2012 financial year. They however 
received N$1.092 million in 2012, an amount applied for in the previous 
financial year. The amount of N$1.092 million was based on a pilot project 
proposal to provide potential beneficiaries with fully serviced land and full title 
with a top structure. The project has however not started as building costs 
have escalated and the funds are not enough to accommodate the original 
target group. The CoW provides assistance to groups in financial reporting, 
technical assistance, assistance with municipal services, assistance in 
procuring building materials and general administrative assistance. 
Beneficiaries are expected to procure their own land through the normal 
process.
BT loans are restricted to groups to a maximum value of N$40,000 as 
prescribed by the line ministry. The City has its own Windhoek Housing 
Scheme which provides loans from N$41,000 to N$80,000 to groups. BT 
loans are charged at the prescribed annual interest rate of 4% from N$3,000-
N$34,000 increasing with 0.5% for every additional N$1000 up to a maximum 
of N$40,000.
According to the official, the City has the same requirements as prescribed by 
the ministry and in addition require applicants to be in groups that own land.
Beneficiaries only start with the payments after the building is completed. BT 
loans cannot be used to buy land.
The City has a revolving fund within its books that accounts for receipts of 
loan payments, but the money is not available to the BT program. The City 
has now opened a call account with its bankers to receive payment from the 
central government and a disbursement account to payout loans to 
beneficiaries.
Taking a closer look at the data provided by the City it is clear that the books 
of the BT loan fund is not as rosy as indicated in the discussions.  
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Since October 2000 the City of Windhoek received grants from the line 
ministry to the value of N$21,983,460. The grant is equal to an average of
N$1,831,955 per annum which is about 61 units per annum at a cost of 
N$30,000. There is no account of the monies received from the repayment 
and accrued interest from the grants.
A total of N$15,035,972.86 was allocated to 1,054 beneficiaries that works out 
to an average of N$14,265 per beneficiary and 88 beneficiaries per year. A 
total of N$6,947,487 remains to be allocated. See table below.













21,983,460 15,035,973 1,054 14,265.63 6,947,487 
The table below shows the total receipts and installments of BT 
loans from beneficiaries in the City of Windhoek. 
Table:4.2: City of Windhoek BT Loan Receipts





Jul-12 85,176 101,383 25,718 3,143,568
Aug-12 89,142 101,383 25,646 3,211,888 68,321 2.17%
Sep-12 110,913 101,298 25,636 3,255,501 43,612 1.36%
Oct-12 83,266 101,450 25,543 3,388,199 132,699 4.08%
Average 92,124.34 101,378.30 25,635.70 2.54%
Except for September 2012, the payments are consistently lower than the 
charges between July and October 2012. The graph below gives a graphical 
picture of the total payment compared to the total charges.
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Figure: 4.1 Repayment Performance 
Arrears on total loans have also increased consistently between July 2012 
and October 2012 and grew with N$244,632. The average rate of increase in 
arrears is an alarming 2.54% per month while the proportion of areas is 23% 
of the total allocated funds. The graph below depicts the graphical image in 
the monthly increase in arrears.



















The CoW use the manual designed and adopted by the line ministry to guide 
procedures.
The CoW has no waiting list. The City only allocates loans to groups with land 
ownership who’s members can prove their income either with a salary advice 
or a sworn declaration of income. Applicants must be older than 21 and 
younger than 50 years.  
About 80% of the group members are up to date with their payments. Normal 
debt management procedures are implemented against those who are in 
arrears. Apart from the normal principle and interest payments, the CoW also 
has an insurance component which includes a life policy and a fire damage 
insurance to settle the loan in the case of death of the principle debtor or 
repair/replace the property in case of fire damage. The BT loans provided by 
the City are also interest rate adjustable loans.
The City has a progress payment system that is agreed with the group. The 
group must provide a quotation for materials and labor before the work can 
start. Funds are disbursed to contractors and suppliers. Beneficiaries do not 
receive any payments directly. Building inspectors from the CoW inspect 
buildings before payments are done to contractors.
The beneficiaries and the City take responsibility for the completion of the 
building. The CoW uses the building plans from the ministry’s technical 
manual and beneficiaries can choose their own building plans. 
A Built Together Committee represented by City Officials and beneficiary 
groups used to be in place. The committee members were selected by the 
CoW and are appointed by the minister for 3 years. The committee is no 
longer functional.
Environments Created by City of Windhoek BT Program Initiatives:
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Plate: 2 City of Windhoek BT House
Plate: 3 City of Windhoek BT Program Houses and street
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4.3 BT PROGRAM BENEFICIARIES
The data tables for the survey results are attached as Appendix E and the 
detailed analysis of the survey results is included as Appendix F.
The analysis was necessary to have a detailed understanding of the profile of 
the BTP beneficiary population. Information collected from personal surveys 
with households are on demographics, economic status, housing conditions, 
housing market, the BTP loans and the application of loan funds. 
This section therefore discusses the characteristics of our respondents. A 
proper understanding of the profile of the sample was necessary to determine 
if the program is reaching the intended target group, if the program delivers 
more than a top structure, if the program is used for self-enrichment through 
speculation and if funds are misallocated by beneficiaries. 
4.3.1 Sample Characteristics: Demographics
The respondents are overwhelmingly female with 87% (26) female and only 
13% (4) male respondents. The respondents were also primarily single 
parents with 43% while 57% are not married. Respondents have a mean age 
of 45.4 years. The average household size is 4.3 persons.
Testing the age of the respondents against the age restrictions of the BT 
Program it is clear that 74% of the respondents qualify in terms of age. Only 
26% of the respondents are older than 50 years. These could be respondents 
who qualified at the time of applying for the loan, but it could also be 
beneficiaries assisted by the SDFN through their social responsibility fund. 
The frequency table below gives an idea of the distribution of the respondents 
in terms of the age qualification requirements of the BT Program.
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Table: 4.3 : BT Program Age Qualifying Criteria
Frequency Table: Qualifying Age






4.3.2 Sample Characteristics: Economic Status: 
A total of 80% of the respondents are employed and the nature of 
employment varies from domestic workers to retail and furniture shops and 
offices.
The income of the 24 employed respondents was analyzed in more detail.
4.3.2.1 Income
The average salary of respondents is N$2,040 with a minimum income of 
N$600 while the maximum income is N$6,595. More than 75% of the sample 
respondents earn more than N$1,300 while 50% of the respondents earn 
between N$1,300 and N$2,500.
The importance of the salary of the household head is confirmed by the pie 
chart below depicting average proportional contributions of various income 
sources of the employed respondents.












The average expenditure for the 24 households with employment is N$2,845 
with a minimum expenditure per household of N$815 and the maximum of 
N$9,290.
Seventy five percent of the employed respondents have expenditures in 
excess of N$2,060 while 50% of the respondent’s expenditure falls between 
N$2,060 and N$3,038.
In terms of the average proportional expenditure, the 24 employed 
respondents spend on average 21% of their income on food, followed by 
clothing with 18% and transport at 15%.  Together the 3 top expenditures 
make up more than 50% of the total expenditure. Expenditure on the home 
loan is only 7th in the queue and make up 4% of the total expenditure. The 
proportional cost of home ownership is high at 38% if we combine the 
expenditure on rates and taxes, the home loan, water and electricity.
Figure 4.4: Average Proportional Expenditure
According to the BT Program, beneficiaries should not earn less than N$100
and not more than N$3000 to qualify for a loan. Most of the respondents fall 
within the qualifying criteria as indicated by the frequency table and histogram 





















Table: 4.4: BT Program Income Qualifying Criteria
Income Qualifying Criteria
Classes Upper limit Freq Freq %
<100 99 0 0%
100-3000 3000 20 73%
>3000 7000 4 27%
4.3.2.3 Income Vs Expenses
Looking at the graph below, the households that fall within the income groups
of N$1000 to N$3000 have a challenge as their monthly expenses are higher 
than their monthly incomes. They must have other sources of income to 
supplement their expenditure. According to the survey, no household has 
cash loans.

















4.3.3 Sample Characteristics: Housing Conditions: 
A survey of the housing conditions was necessary to determine the average 
number of people per room and to assess if overcrowding is a problem. 
The average house of the respondents measure 36.73m on an average plot 
size of 173m. The average house size for SDFN groups is 34 m and for City 
of Groups 52m. On average SDFN groups have 3 rooms (Shared lounge and 
kitchen, shared bath and toilet and one bedroom) while City of Windhoek 
groups have four rooms per house basically comprising of two bedrooms, 
shared bath and toilet and shared lounge and kitchen. 
Seventy five percent of the houses have 3 rooms and more while 50% of the 
respondents have houses between 3 and 4 rooms. 
The average number of years of the sample respondents per house is 9.9 
while seventy five percent of the sample respondents stay in their houses for 
more than 7 years and fifty percent of the respondents stayed in their houses 
between 7 and 12 years.
The study was interested to find out if respondents were satisfied with the 
number of rooms in their current houses and if not how many rooms would 
please them. There were 27 respondents on this question.
The average house people desired was with 6 rooms which are 2 rooms more 
than the average of their current houses. In particular respondents want 2 
additional bedrooms and the fact that the current house had a shared kitchen 
and lounge and a shared toilet and bathroom did not really worry them.
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4.3.4 Sample Characteristics: Housing Market: 
The researcher wanted to know if beneficiaries were taking part in the 
program to make quick money or if they wanted to improve their living 
conditions. 
There is virtually no secondary housing market to speak about amongst the 
respondents. Only one of the respondents considered selling his house. Most 
respondents never considered selling and have no idea of the market value of 
their houses. Respondents estimated that they could rent out their houses at 
a minimum of N$2,000 and a maximum of N$3,500. There was only one case 
where the beneficiary household moved into the shack to rent out the main 
house after losing his permanent employment. 
Most respondents estimated that they could sell their houses at about the 
original loan value used to construct the house and did not take into account 
the actual cost of the building and the land. Dibasen, a municipal group 
estimated that they could sell their houses between N$250,000 and 
N$300,000. 
All respondents preferred to own their houses as oppose to rent and most 
preferred individual ownership as opposed to group ownership. Most 
respondents received ownership through groups.
On a question on how much they spend on building the house most
respondents except for Dibasen only quoted the loan value and there is no 
consideration for sweat equity contributed by house owners. 
The average cost of building the house according to the respondents is 
N$29,567.
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4.3.5 Sample Characteristics: Built-Together Loans
Most beneficiaries were informed of the loan scheme by group members. 
They also received the loan the same year they applied for it and received the 
amount they applied for. Deposits were only required from SDFN members. 
All SDFN beneficiaries contributed sweat equity while the houses were 
constructed by appointed builders.
4.3.6 Sample Characteristics: Application of funds
All SDFN members completed their houses. Three of the 15 City of Windhoek 
group members did not complete their houses while all respondents drew 
their full loan amounts. All beneficiaries are however occupying their 
respective houses. Money was not directly paid to beneficiaries, but to 
suppliers, contractors/builders and to group accounts.
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4.4 AFFORDABILITY
This section will further take a closer look at the affordability of units by 
describing and analyzing beneficiary average incomes, the average size of 
units, the cost of BT Program housing units and the value of the loan amounts 
allocated to beneficiaries.
4.4.1 Building Costs
The Ministry of Regional, Local Government, Housing and Rural Development 
(MRLGH&RD) has four proposed plans for BT houses. The plans are not 
prescribed, but give local authorities and their beneficiaries an idea on 
possible structures and associated costs.
The smallest structure has a gross building area of 18 m and is 5.44 meters 
wide by 3.33 meters in length. The building comprise of one bedroom of 9.22 
m, a shared toilet and bathroom of 4.24 m and a corridor of 2.32 m (internal 
measurements).
Diagram: 4.3
The building material for constructing this structure in August 2009 was 
N$23,880 including VAT. Building material for the exact same building in 
November 2012 would cost N$33,022. The tables comparing the material cost 
for the smallest and biggest houses are included as Appendix D for a detailed 
overview. The N$33,022 excludes the price increase in plumbing material as 












The cost per square meter on the small house for material only in 2009 was 
N$1,327 and in 2012 N$1,835 representing an increase of N$508 per square 
meter or 38% over a 3 year period. The increase in the cost of building 
materials equates to an annual rate increase of 11.41%. The real value 
increase in the cost of materials for the 18m is 20.7% as indicated by the 
building material cost index table below.
Building Material Cost Index:

















2009 8.8% 1.09 8.8% 1.09 1 0.0%
2010 4.5% 1.14 0.0% 1.09 0.9569378 -4.3% Cost data 
not 
Available2011 5.0% 1.19 0.0% 1.09 0.91136933 -4.8%
2012 6.6% 1.27 38.3% 1.50 1.1822153 29.7%
Inflation Date Source CBS (2012 Estimate) Base Year 2009: = 0 20.7%
Building cost excludes the cost of labor and the cost of the plot/erf. The cost 
of labor can vary widely depending on the level of finishes expected. 
Variables include inside and outside plastering, the type of roof and the floor 
finish. The cost per square meter will vary between N$300 and N$500. At 
N$300 per square meter the labor costs works out at N$5,400 for a 18 m 
house. The total cost for the entry level house would be N$38,422 
(33,022+5,400) and works out to N$2,135 per square meter.
The cost per square meter for the 44.5 m house has increase from N$43,068 
in August 2009 to N$61,401 in November 2012 representing an increase of 
N$18,333 or 43%. Prices include VAT but exclude labor. The cost for 
plumbing was not adjusted for the same reason mentioned earlier.
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NHAG in contrast has 2 standard plans, a 20m and a 32m house. These 
plans are prescribed and the 32m house is basically an easy extension of the 
smaller house. 
The building quote from ‘Build It’, a local building material supplier estimates 
the material for the 20m house at N$12,118.85 including 15% VAT on 12 
September 2012. The quote by Built-It excludes labor, bricks, building sand 
and building stone. NHAG estimates labor at N$3000, sand and stone at 
N$4000, and bricks at N$1,200. Bricks are made by the group. The total cost 
for the small house will therefore be about N$20,318.85 with a cost per 
square meter of N$1,016
Diagram: 4.4 Big House : 32m
The small house will exclude the bedroom and the living room will function as 
a bedroom.
The value of that NHAG adds to the building process is clear as households 
can get more house for their dollar. At N$1,016 NHAG’s building cost per 
square meter is N$1,119 cheaper per square meter compared to the N$2,135 









4.4.2 The Cost of Land
Information on the cost of land was drawn from the survey forms.
There were 26 responses to this question and households on average paid 
N$5,061 per plot with a minimum of N$2,250 and a maximum of N$7,996.
Seventy five percent of respondents paid more than N$4,167 per plot.
The distribution of the cost per plot is indicated by the frequency table below. 
Seventy three percent of the plots cost less than N$6000.










The total development cost for a 18 m would be N$38,422 plus the cost of 
the land which sells on average N$5,061 which means that the total cost per 
family for an entry level house will be at least N$ 43,483.
Households will therefore have to use the maximum loan value of N$40,000 
provided by the BT Scheme and in addition contribute an additional N$3,483
to house themselves.
A loan of N$40,000 at the maximum interest rate of 7% payable over 20 years 
will cost the household N$310 per month. The household will have to make an 
additional contribution of N$3,483 by accessing savings or take an additional 
loan at commercial rates to supplement the BT loan.  
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4.4.4 The Value of the Loan
The maximum value of the loan and the interest payment schedules for the 
BT loan scheme has remained constant since 2007. Households and local
authorities intentionally target to stay within the N$34,000 range per 
beneficiary to benefit from the lowest interest rate possible at 4%. A N$34,000 
loan at 4% over 20 years requires a down payment of N$206.03 per month. 
The total interest payments will be N$15,448 bringing the total down payment 
including capital to N$49,448. One Namibian Dollar is equal to one South 
African Rand.
Over the years the value of one Namibian Dollar has decreased by 15.3% just 
taking the Namibian Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the Namibian 
Central Bureau of Statistics in consideration. Building cost inflation is normally 
much higher than the CPI. So the value of N$34,000 in 2009 in today’s terms 
is worth only N$28,812 or N$5,188 less in 2012.

















2009 8.8% 1.09 8.8% 1.09 1 0.0%
2010 4.5% 1.14 0.0% 1.09 0.956938 -4.3%
2011 5.0% 1.19 0.0% 1.09 0.911369 -4.8%
2012 6.6% 1.27 0.0% 1.09 0.854943 -6.2%
Inflation Date Source CBS (2012 Estimate) Base Year 2009: = 0 -15.3%
Just to buy the same value of goods with the N$34,000 of 2009 the loan value 
has to increase to N$43,180 or with 27%.
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2009 8.8% 1.09 8.8% 1.09 1 0.0%
2010 4.5% 1.14 4.5% 1.14 1 0.0%
2011 5.0% 1.19 5.0% 1.19 1 0.0%
2012 6.6% 1.27 6.6% 1.27 1 0.0%
Source CBS (2012 Estimate) 0.0%
Households that do not belong to the SDFN network following the standard 
house building process to build the entry level structure of 18 m will not 
complete their houses at today’s prices of N$38,422 unless they contribute 
additional funds or take the maximum loan of N$40,000 at 7% interest.
Households that belong to the SDFN network and are supported by NHAG on 
the other hand can easily complete their 20m house at N$20,318.85. These 
households in contrast pay 5% interest on their loans through NHAG which 
works out at N$224.39 payment per month for a loan of N$34,000 over 20 
years. The total interest payments made by SDFN households amount to 
N$19,852 or in total N$53,852 including capital, a difference of N$4,404 




Following the analysis above we are now ready to do a performance 
assessment of the BT Program.
Based on the targets set in chapter 3, the BT Program has performed poorly 
on a number of critical performance areas. The overall response of the BT 
Program is not focused and the response does not meet the housing demand 
indicating that the nature and the scale of the problem do not inform the BT 
Program. Financial resources are inadequate to finance project applications 
from Local Authorities and Regional Councils while there is no involvement of 
the private sector in financing Program. The Program further promotes house 
ownership and does not allow for rental units while the products continue to 
be single houses on individual plots.
The research found that the units meet the requirements of adequate shelter 
as defined by the UN as all BT Program products are fully services and within 
easy reach of work, recreational and social opportunities. One of the most 
successful components of the program is its ability to allow for a progressive 
housing solution by the involvement of housing NGO’s such as the 
SDFN/NHAG and the involvement of smaller community groups.
See table 4.9 below for a detailed assessment of the BT Program using the 
Balance Scorecard conceptual framework.
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Note: Measurements and Targets are limited to City of Windhoek
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After the detailed data analysis and a formal assessment on the performance 
of the BT loan scheme, we are now ready to test our hypothesis that the BTP 
failed to realize the objective of providing adequate housing at an appropriate 
scale that is affordable to low income groups in Namibia, because funds are 
inadequate while the process of allocation allows for misappropriation at local 
government level.
In testing the hypothesis it was found that the Program fared badly in 
delivering housing consistently while the checks and balances within the 
system are inadequate to ensure the ministry gets value for its money. 
Inadequate housing:
The ministry approves BT Program projects on a project by project basis. It is 
the responsibility of its customers, in this case the City of Windhoek and the 
SDFN to complete Project Identification Forms for approval by the ministry. 
SDFN has only submitted one project with 11 beneficiaries within Windhoek in 
2012. The City on the other-hand has made no application. Even the money 
that was allocated for the application made in the previous financial year was 
not used by the CoW for the intended project during 2012. The reason why 
the ministry took so long to approve the funds applied for in 2011 is because 
the CoW wanted to deviate from the normal BT Program implementation 
process. 
The primary bottleneck in the housing delivery process is the delivery of 
serviced land. This is why the SDFN acquires unserviced land (blocks of land 
without municipal services) for servicing across Namibia. The CoW on the 
other-hand has access to large tracts of land, but does not have the financing 
to service the land.
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According to the CoW estimates, there were just more than 20,000 
households in Windhoek in need of adequate housing in 2012. The population 
in the informal settlements is estimated to grow at a compound rate of 9.49% 
per annum. According to these estimates, poor households grew with an 
additional 2,819 households in 2012.
At an average delivery rate of 110 houses per annum, the average annual 
delivery of the BT Program in Windhoek is inadequate to meet the demand for 
low income housing. In short the annual demand far outstrips annual supply 
which means that the backlog in low income housing is growing at an 
alarming rate. When one considers the actual delivery of only 11 units in 
2012, the real scale of the problem is fully realized. 
Inadequate Funding:
The ministry normally approves hundred percent of the funds applied for on a 
project by project basis. 
The City of Windhoek has a total of N$6.9 million unallocated funds from 
grants received from the ministry. This figure excludes the capital and interest 
repayments received from beneficiaries.
Funds are therefore adequate to finance approved projects, but the Council 
fails to implement the approved projects.
Misappropriation of Funds
Funds in the Council are ring-fenced for the BT Program, but are not 
immediately used for the BT Program. Funds might be allocated in time, but 
the actual transfer of money into the approved projects by the Council is 
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delayed. The projects might be delayed for various reasons, but the most 
important challenge remains the availability of serviced land.
There are no formal audits to trace the funds within the City and this allows for 
a laid-back approach to managing the funds. Funds can therefore be used to 
finance short term requirements as opposed to approved BT Program 
projects. This does not proof that there is misappropriation, but it does leave 
room for misallocation in the interim.
Hypothesis Acceptance:
In view of the above analysis, the researcher has to accept the hypothesis 
that the BT Program’s loan scheme has failed to realize the objective of 
providing adequate housing to the poor. Funds are available, but are not 
allocated properly which allows for the misallocation of funds within councils. 
The average loan value of the BT program has decreased in real terms, but is 
still adequate to build houses albeit smaller units. BT Program funds are 
sometimes only book entries, and the actual cash might not be available to 
fund approved projects.
The main reason for the poor performance of the BT Program loan scheme is 




5 Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion.
5.1 Introduction:
Chapter 5 presents the findings, recommendations and conclusions drawn 
from the empirical data. One of the objectives of the study is to review the BT 
Program in order to make recommendations to improve the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the program.  
5.2 Key findings and Recommendations:
5.2.1 Overall Aims, Objective and Hypothesis Findings
The aim of the research paper is to assess the adequacy of the Namibian 
response to the housing problem by taking a closer look at the BTP and
assess if the program is delivering at an appropriate scale with sufficient 
resources that delivers a product that meet the requirements of adequate 
shelter.
Our hypothesis for the research is that the BTP failed to deliver adequate 
housing, because funds are inadequate while the process of allocation allows 
for misappropriation. An analytical tool, the Balance Scorecard is used to 
assess the overall performance of the program and to test the hypothesis.
The research has provided evidence that the BT Program has failed to 
provide adequate housing to the poor in Windhoek. Funds allocated to the 
BTP are not immediately used to build houses while the municipal council fails 
to reinvest capital and interest repayments of beneficiaries. Reporting and 
monitoring controls of the BT Program are also non-existent and cannot 
ensure that funds are used for the BT Program. The detailed assessment of 
the program is included in the final section of the preceding chapter.
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The following section reports the key findings on each of the measures and 
indicators identified in the Balance Scorecard and make recommendations on 
how to improve on each of these measures.
5.2.2 Financial Perspective 
a) Adequate Scale of the Program:
i) According to the data presented, the scale of the program is not 
sufficient to tackle the low income housing program. Funds are 
adequate, but are not applied effectively. The availability of 
affordable serviced land is identified as one of the main culprits 
in the slow delivery of the BT Program. The land delivery system 
has to be expedited to increase the rate of delivery to the poor to 
facilitate the implementation of the BT Program on a larger 
scale.
ii) It is recommended that Councils must use revolving funds to 
facilitate the delivery of housing. The revolving fund should be 
used to allocate funds to the BT Program not only to supplement 
the budget, but also to release funds timely in the beginning of 
each budget year. 
b) Value for money:
i) According to the data presented, BT loans are on average 
N$29,567 per loan and benefits on average 110 households per 
year and about 4.4 people per loan. Units are very basic, and do 
not have high quality finishes, but do offer adequate protection 
from the elements. Units sampled, were all substantially 
completed to allow households to occupy the houses. 
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c) Maximize Available Funds:
i) According to the data presented, the cost of the BT Program 
house is normally double the Namibian Dollar value of the loan 
received. The market value could be much higher, but because 
of a lack of a secondary market, the market value cannot be 
confirmed.
ii) Unfortunately, the data shows that grants received by the Local 
Authority are not reinvested. There is therefore great potential to 
increase the benefits of loans.
iii) The survey shows that loans for extensions and new houses are 
currently funded under the same policy. It is recommended that 
the building of new houses be funded through grants from the 
ministry while extensions are to be funded through housing 
revolving funds administered by councils. Extensions therefore 
are to be funded by capital repayments and interest charges of 
existing BT loans.
d) Program Sustainability:
i) According to the data presented, the BT loan scheme is not 
sustainable at the moment and the program is still dependent on 
government grants after 20 years. Repayment rates are too low 
while the real value of the loan has decrease overtime. The loan 
repayments are fixed over 20 years even for very small loans 
and the primary objective is to maintain an affordable repayment 
amount. 
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It is recommended that the term of the loan be influenced by the 
loan value and not only by the repayment amount.  Smaller 
loans can be amortized over shorter periods. The credit control 
system needs to be reviewed and lessons could be learnt from 
the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 
ii) According to the data collected, loans are currently offered 
based on value and there is no association between the value of 
the loan and the structure to be build. 
It is proposed that the loan value be linked to the structure the 
applicant intends to erect. To maximize the impact a minimum 
contribution per structure can be defined by the Program.
iii) It is further recommended that the ministry maintains a building 
material cost index and associate the loan to a basic structure 
as opposed to absolute loan values as these loan values do not 
keep track with inflation
5.2.3 Customer and Beneficiary Perspective 
a) Enabling Environment:
i) The research could not identify records of surveys measuring
customer satisfaction. The relationship between the 
Windhoek Council and the Ministry could not be determined 
with certainty, but during personal interviews a sentiment of 
mutual mistrust was identified. No evidence could be found 
on official efforts from either the Council or the Ministry to 
build a productive relationship. 
ii) The research found no evidence on beneficiary satisfaction 
surveys. The BT Program continues to be implemented 
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without a clear understanding of the requirements of 
beneficiaries.
According to the sample data, most of the beneficiaries meet 
the age and income requirements of the BT loan scheme. 
The sample data shows that most of the beneficiaries 
completed their houses which improved their general living 
conditions. Most of the beneficiaries continue to stay in their 
houses and were not interested in short term gains of selling 
their houses. According to the sample data, most of the 
beneficiaries heard about the loan scheme through group 
members indicating that the advertisement of the program 
might be inadequate. The sample data further show that 
most of the beneficiaries completed their houses which is an 
indication that funds were properly applied once allocated to 
beneficiaries.
iii) The research found no evidence that formal banks are 
participating in the program. Credit is necessary to upgrade 
units overtime. BT Program houses can serve as collateral 
as they have security of tenure and full services.
It is recommended that commercial mortgage products be 
developed in conjunction with banks to make credit 
accessible to BT Program beneficiaries. 
iv) The research shows that the BT Program already follows the 
Progressive Housing concept. The focus is very much on the 
process and less on the product.
It is recommended that the involvement of communities and 
individuals be strengthen even further by making 
communities part of the revision of the Program on an annual 
basis
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v) The research shows that products delivered by the BT 
Program are adequate presently, but there is definitely a 
concern as the units will have to be reduced in size to fit into 
the available loans. Further, as available empty pockets of 
land are taken-up, the houses are pushed to the fringes of 
the city away from work, recreation and social facilities.
It is recommended that the ministry defines the minimum 
size of the structure to ensure that the units remain adequate 
to beneficiaries. It is further recommended that the suitable 
land be identified within the existing urban structure to 
accommodate future beneficiaries.
vi) The research shows that the current program continues to 
promote owner occupied houses located on individual plots.
It  is recommended that rental housing be allowed by the 
Program and that other housing forms for example row 
housing be introduced to make products more affordable and 
promote higher urban densities and integration. Government 
incentives such as tax breaks can effectively be used to 
promote other forms of housing at desirable locations. 
5.2.4 Internal Processes
a) Efficient and Effective Loan Application Process:
i) The research discovered that the BT Program has properly 
developed and tested implementation guidelines and 
procedures supported by an administrative and technical 
manual developed by the ministry.
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The application process is prescribed and adequate 
documentation exists that explains the loan application and 
approval process. Council projects are approved on a project by 
project basis while the ministry does not keep a waiting list and 
the time of projects on the waiting list cannot be determined.
All three organizations use these implementation guidelines and 
procedures as their main point of reference while NHAG has a
few customizations to personalize the procedures.
ii) The research shows that the variation of plans and the degree of 
freedom to change plans can be regarded as one of the main 
culprits for not completing houses. The research has shown that 
the total development cost of the smallest house (18 m) 
proposed by the technical manual is higher than the maximum 
BT loan amount of N$40,000. The technical manual for the 
program has to be updated to limit the variation in plans. It is 
recommended that the plans adopted by the SDFN/NHAG be 
prescribed to all BT beneficiaries. The small house of 20m is 
easily extendable to 32m. Additional extensions are also 
relatively easy with the structure proposed by SDFN/NHAG.
b) Risk Management:
i) According to the research, the flow of funds from the ministry to 
the local authority and ultimately to the beneficiary is not 
tracked. There is therefore no data available on how soon funds 
flow to beneficiaries. According to respondents they get funding 
in the same year they applied, but adequate tracking is required. 
It seems that projects are delayed and cash might be allocated 
to more urgent projects within councils. The line ministry relies 
on the Auditor General to conduct audits to test internal 
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procedures at councils and ensure the proper allocation of 
funds. 
ii) The research shows that financial administration of BT loans 
leave much to be desired as confirmed by Auditor General 
Reports.  The ministry has to develop checks and balances to 
ensure the funds are used for the intended purposes.
It is recommended that the ministry insist on having three 
separate bank accounts for the councils to qualify for BT loan 
funds. The first loan account is to receive grants from the line 
ministry; the second account is a disbursement account for 
payments to suppliers and contractors. On approval of a BT 
loan, the funds will be transferred from the central government 
receipt account to the disbursement account. The third and final 
account is the receipts from capital repayments and interest 
charges of existing beneficiaries. Funds in the third account will 
be transferred to the disbursement account for payment to newly 
qualified beneficiaries. As previously recommended these funds 
should be targeted for extensions.
There will be additional bank charges, but the benefits of 
implementing the three separate accounts outweigh the costs.
iii) According to the research, funds from the Council are not 
disbursed directly to beneficiaries but to builders/contractors and 
building material suppliers. This system is adequate, but it 
allows for poor accountability. Household heads must be trained 
before funds are allocated to ensure that the ultimate quality of 
the house is their responsibility. The system of sign-off by the 
home owner has to be implemented strictly to ensure that 
builders complete the work that they quoted for and the right 
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material is supplied and all the material is used in the house. 
Prospective owners need to know that all excess material is 
their property because they paid for it.
It is recommended that all beneficiaries undergo a training 
program to ensure they understand their rights and 
responsibilities and is part of the project from start to finish. 
NHAG/SDFN training programs and trainers can be recruited to 
train non-members.
5.2.5 Learning and Growth
a) According to the research, the strategy and vision of the BT Program is 
not clear. Targets for housing delivery have to be specified nationally 
and the different players in housing delivery should specify their targets 
within the framework of the national targets. Government must base 
delivery targets and their budget allocations to achieve national targets 
specified and agreed nationally
b) The research found that the line ministry is a learning organization. The 
BT Program is reviewed on a regular basis and experiences are 
worked into the procedures.  Standard manuals and operational 
guidelines are in place and are regularly updated. Manuals and 
guidelines have been reviewed on 5 year intervals.
It is however recommended that annual revision targets be set to 
ensure that the latest lessons are formally incorporated in the 
administrative process.
c) According to the research, the ministry is adequately staffed, but more 
can be done to train staff. 
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According to information collected from interviews with senior officials 
at the City of Windhoek and the line ministry officials working on the BT 
program receive most of their skills and knowledge from workshops 
and limited training is offered by their respective employers. NHAG is 
the only institution that provided formal training to employees. 
Employers rely heavily on prior knowledge and government workshops 
to train staff.
The basic competencies for a successful BT program officer has to be 
specified and training material has to be developed to train officials to 
acquire these skills in a structured manner. All officials must go through 
refresher training courses to ensure they remain in touch with the 
operations of the program.
The financial and reporting system of the BT program is poor. A 
computerized system is available at the ministry to administrate the 
loans, but the same system is not used by councils for loan 
administration. The system originally developed by the MRLGH&RD 
has failed and the ministry is busy rolling out a new system.  It is 
recommended that the IT system be rolled out to all local authorities 
who are beneficiaries of the BT Program. A centralized system would 
speed-up reporting and monitoring of the program.
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5.3 Conclusion
The primary aim of the research paper was to review the performance of the 
BT Program to improve the operations of the program. The paper started with 
a claim that the BTP failed to realize the objective of providing adequate 
housing at an appropriate scale that is affordable to low income groups in 
Namibia, because funds are inadequate while the process of allocation allows 
for misappropriation at local government level.
Using the concepts and analytical tools of the Balance Scorecard, the 
research has provided evidence that the BT Program has failed to provide 
adequate housing to the poor in Windhoek. Although the ministry allocates 
adequate funds on application, funds are not immediately used to build 
houses while the municipal council fails to reinvest capital and interest 
repayments of beneficiaries. Reporting and monitoring controls of the BT 
Program are also non-existent and cannot ensure that funds are used for the 
BT Program.
The BT program overall is critical to support the weak in society as the 
primary beneficiaries are women and single parents who are clearly in need of 
assistance from government. It is therefore advocated that the Program 
continue, but that it be reviewed to maximize the value of the funds.
Critical to the improvement of the BT Program is the need to define a clear 
strategy for the program. The Program further needs to define its objectives, 
measures and targets to achieve the strategy. Targets will have to be set 
within the framework of present performance and industry benchmarks. 
Further research is required in defining these industry benchmarks.
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